This article examines concepts of “Europe” and “the West” as represented in web-forums of Russian-speaking migrants in the United Kingdom. First, I will discuss the methodological approach utilized in this study; second, I will explore particular dimensions of the notions under investigation; third, I will define the argumentative strategies employed by these migrants.

METHODOLOGY

This study belongs to the Foucauldian tradition of the analysis of discourse, and is aimed at revealing various ways of expressing power and hidden social and cultural patterns of meanings. A Foucauldian approach refers to discourse as simultaneously the means and the effects of power. According to Foucault, “the problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another. From this follows a refusal of analysis in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures, and a recourse to analysis in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics”.^[1] At this point the Foucauldian genealogical analysis is tightly linked with critical discourse analysis (CDA), and particularly with a CDA Discourse-Historical approach wherein representations of the world, social relations and identities are perceived as discursively constructed and always connected to the discourses that were produced earlier, synchronically and subsequently.^[2] Such an approach is relevant to the study of the discursive construction of migrants’ identities, which are informed by the national discourse of their country of origin in both synchronic and historic perspectives, and at the same time are located at the margins of their host country’s identity discourse.
Migrants are discussed as a marginal group during the process of re-evaluating their national identity. It is accepted in this study that migrants are producers and products of a discourse^[3] that combines “unspeakable stories of subjectivity” and “narratives of a culture,”^[4] and where language is not perceived as transparent, but as interspersed with references to cultural and temporal phenomena. Discourse in this case can be defined as an “attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices and sociocultural practices.”^[5]Moreover, discourse should be understood as socially and temporally positioned ways of representing reality by individuals, groups and institutions. In this study, messages sent by Russian speaking migrants to Internet forums are treated as a primary resource for the study (discursively constructed) national identities in order to identify patterns (“systematic links”) of migrants’ negotiated perceptions (i.e., their sociocultural practices).
This type of discourse analysis aims to unpack the opaque connections between narratives of everyday communications and power networks, and to trace the ideological patterns that have been “naturalized” and accepted as the only logical way of thought or lifestyle.^[6] For example, Foucault shows how power networks influence a society by discoursing the categories of “normal” or “abnormal,” as well as “right” and “wrong.”^[7] Foucault terms these discursive practices of conceptualizing reality as “normalization,” because discourse imposes an understanding of what is “true,” “natural” or “normal,” and what is not. Naturalization is done at out-of-awareness level, and therefore our social practices and use of language “are bound up with causes and effects which we may not be aware of under normal conditions.”^[8] Wodak argues that attempts to make implicit relationships – in her own words “obscure structures of power, political control, and dominance”^[9] – explicit by means of discourse analyses, and also includes “strategies of inclusion and exclusion in language use”^[10] in the research agenda. In the same vein this article aims to analyze how “naturalized” perceptions of power and privilege are reflected in the identity discourse of Russian migrants.
Strategies of inclusion and exclusion are examined through practices of “othering” within identity negotiations: how migrants define the “other,” who is marked as “out-group”, and what does it say about the migrants’ self-perceptions. The question of othering is connected in this study with the ability and experience in dealing with difference. This article adopts the view of Lotman and Uspenskii on the “dualism and the absence of a neutral axiological zone” in Russian public discourses, where the new fails to provide continuity, but is regarded as “eschatological replacements of everything.”^[11] Drawing on the concept of cultural binarism, Jeffrey Hosking holds that the process of othering is of special significance for Russian national identity. Hosking believes that

“Russians have always been actively conscious of the distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders,” an attitude which they readily transfer to the international plane. […] The phrase u nas (in our village, at our workplace, in our country) is very evocative and frequently used; Russians are always surprised that English has no precise equivalent.”^[12]

Othering in identity discourse is not shaped merely through stressing differences, but as right or wrong distinctions. Hosking notes that “nash” is not merely a description but a value judgement: “The contrast between my (we) and oni (they) is very marked and the judgement on ne nash (he is not one of us) correspondingly damaging”.^[13] Using the Foucauldian terminology adopted in this study indicates that Russians demonstrate a tendency to construct differences in terms of normality and abnormality in the process of self-identification.
Drawing on Foucault, Russian migrants’ discourses are examined through the argumentative strategies of the researched group, with a special focus on identifying absences and silences within their discourse. The concept of strategies in discourse analysis can be defined in general terms “as recurrent ways of talking” that “provide familiar and conventional representations of people and events, by filtering and crystallizing ideas, and by providing pre-fabricated means by which ideas can be easily conveyed and grasped.”^[14] It is worth mentioning that Foucault pays special attention to the analysis of absent players, topics etc., interpreting them as the key-zones of argumentative strategies.

RUSSIA AND THE WEST – MULTIPLICITY OF DIMENSIONS

While reading discussions in open access migrants’ Internet forums I came across various references to Europeanism and non-Europeanism. These references comprise an important part in the negotiation of migrants’ identity, not only because people stay in a European country, but primarily because the concept of Europe and the West has played a formative role in Russian national identity discourse as the great Other.^[15] For example, Neumann writes that the idea of Europe emerged as “the main Other in relation to which the idea of Russia is defined.”^[16] Additionally, Liah Greenfeld notes that “the West was an integral, indelible part of the Russian national consciousness.”^[17] To describe the binary Russia-Europe dilemmas of othering, Greenfeld uses the term ressentiment, which is connected with suppressed feelings of envy and hatred. Such attitudes resulted in an ambiguous attitude towards Europe, coined by Fonvisin: “How can we remedy the two contradictory and most harmful prejudices: the first, that everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands everything is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, and with us everything is good?”^[18]
The Russian community not only constructed an image of itself in comparison with the West, but symbolically re-imagined “the West.” During several centuries of intense communication with European cultures, Russian national identity discourse constantly changed its notions of “Europe” and “the West” to reflect changes in Russia itself. Europe does not emerge in Russian national identity discourse as a geographical reality, rather it can be considered a myth in Schцpflin’s sense.^[19] Likewise, Lotman believes that the myth of Europe was (in Schцpflin’s words) “held by a community upon itself,” where the narrative of the myth played the role of a “higher reality.”^[20] Lotman also concludes that “contacts with the real life in the West often turned into tragedies, and a zapadnic became a critic of the West”.^[21]
Thus, in Russian national identity discourse, Europe emerges not as a cultural and political reality, but as a construct of mental geography. Although the West in this formula has only been vaguely defined geographically and ethnically, it is distinguished culturally by a variety of positive and negative associations. While the West has been praised for its dynamism, industrial development, technological superiority and longstanding traditions of education and civility, it also has been conceived as a vicious and unreliable Other, taking advantage of Russia’s innocence and kindness. The dilemma of “Russia versus the West” has become multifaceted for a new wave of migrants leaving the country after the fall of the Soviet Union in the nineties. At this time geographical borders ceased to be opaque curtains, but paradoxically the elusiveness of geographical borders highlights the importance of self-imposed cultural ones.
Furthermore, I will describe what dimensions of the concepts of “Europeanism” and “the West” are used in these on-line forums. Then I intend to trace how the migrants mark their “otherness” in the host society through their affiliations with Europe in territorial, religious, cultural, and civic terms. I also intend to prove that migrants’ new civic experiences represent a separate discourse on-line.

HOW IS THE “RUSSIA VERSUS THE WEST” DICHOTOMY IMAGINED TODAY WHEN A PERSON STAYS IN THE WEST?

The first thread to be discussed is titled “Are the Germans right?” and started with a reference to an article in the Financial Times about a law passed by the parliament of Baden-Wurttemberg that banned the wearing of headscarves by teachers in state schools.^[22] This discussion in the open access Russian language forum Rupoint took place over a month and contained 292 posts.^[23] This thread has been chosen for examination, because it does not directly address the ideas of Europeanism or the topic of Russia and the West, and represents a typical example of how narratives of Europeanism emerge from of a relatively unrelated topic and without any special encouragement. This thread maps the meaning of Europeanism as perceived by migrants, and shows that while the notion of “Europe” comprises a variety of readings and represents an ideal for migrants, the West keeps its role as the great Other of Russia.
This discussion was launched by a participant named lana_h who posted the question “Are the Germans right?” to the forum.^[24] Instantly, the first reply connects the question of minority dress with the concept of Europeanism. The custom of wearing unusual clothes is seen by the participant as a lack of respect for what the Russian migrant perceives as European culture. The post welcomes the group’s decision:

“At last! It’s been long overdue. At least some respect for the European culture.”

The same reply connects the new German law with the situation in Great Britain, asking when the same measures will be implemented there. The United Kingdom is referred to as “at our place.” The author self-identifies with the native population of the country of residence:

“I wonder, when will it happen at our place??”^[25]

Self-identifying with the host population, the author does not question British vs. continental European cultural dilemmas, but inscribes a certain “European identity” upon the British. Finally, the discussant highlights the importance of traditions, proudly stating that they have always been essential for British culture in particular:

“And this is in a country that has always worshiped traditions.”

The following message describes European countries as historically “enlightened” and educated:

“…should the “enlightened” countries match with them?”

Contributors perceive that the local traditions of the host cultures are superior to the minority narratives of migrants, although they do not necessarily reflect on their own “foreign” status. Rather than determining the content of “Europeanism,” migrants define European culture by “purifying” it from what they believe are non-European components in terms of ethnicity and culture.

“Both Russians and Arabs have their culture and traditions. It is just that the culture and traditions of Russians – are European.”^[26]

Defining what is “not European,” Russian-speaking migrants declare the priority of local rules and traditions as a predicament of territory, rather than society:

“While in the Middle East, or in Northern or Western Africa, I don’t wear slippers, don’t wear shorts or t-shirts. I.e. I follow and respect the mores and customs of the country I am in. Why can’t the immigrants that came to Europe do the same? If they do not respect us, how can we respect them?”^[27]

This post shows that when discussing migrants of other origins, this contributor also self-identifies with the population of the host European country; the author exempts himself from the notion of “immigrants into Europe,” and refers to Middle Eastern migrants as “them” and the local population as “us.”
The idea of the superiority of European culture plays an important role in the discourse. Russian-speaking migrants tend to praise European traditions as an embodiment of a universal culture and the only civilized region. An analysis of the researched texts shows that the notions cultural, European, and civilized often operate as synonyms. The following quotations are extracted from various threads and forums.

“…why, all my friends and acquaintances are very cultured people, I can certainly call them Europeans.”^[28]
This example demonstrates that being cultured is perceived by migrants as one of the typical characteristics of being European. Another participant declares that civilization is created and dispersed around the world solely by Europeans:

“Kipling did not consider “Russian Asians” to be Europeans, the bearers of civilization.”^[29]

In this quote Europe is discoursed as a cultural phenomenon (civilization) and a geographical zone at the same time. Asia, Asians are used as an antithesis to Europeanism. In the same vein, Africa is excluded from “civilization”, while Europe embodies it (the quote shows that the author believes that he or she is a cultured and civilized person, because he or she was born in Europe):

“Africa, for sure, has never been (and will never be) a part of civilization, which Europe, from where I come from, has been and is.”^[30]

The religious perspective of Europeanism also unfolds early in the discussion “are Germans right?” The author questions whether one should equate European culture with a Christian one, and associate religious affiliations with national identity.

“Is it necessary to associate one’s national (civic) belonging with a religious one?”^[31]

This question deciphers the notion of “national,” emphasizing affiliation with a certain country, rather than with an ethnicity or religion. The religious dimension of Europeanism as discussed in this thread is especially self-contradictory. Participants become confused when they attempt to discuss purely religious divisions.
For example, the thread shows the dualism of their attitude to religious freedom in Russia as compared to Europe. Migrants share the opinion that the current re-introduction of Orthodox services in the Russian army contradicts the principle of religious equality, yet a little earlier in the discussion contributors supported the idea that Christianity should be accepted as the “main religion” in Europe.

“They should know that the main religion in this country is – Christianity.”^[32]

Again, as in previous posts, the author’s opinion is that his personal views are also those of the host population in the United Kingdom, and a priori the native population of Europe. Non-Christian migrants to Europe are categorized in the statement above as “they”, used with the imperative “must”.
Various messages develop the idea that religion and culture are patterned with a definite geographical space and are entitled to special privileges there. One of the contributors quotes the proverb:

“When in Rome do as romans [sic] do.”^[33]

The following ten posts agree that people traditionally living in a certain territory (described in these posts as owners, masters of the house) are entitled to feel “at home” and keep up the traditional way of life.

“…if you invite someone to your house, you would expect from your guests to respect and accept the rules of behavior, customs etc. that are accepted in your house.”^[34]
“…there are less tolerant hosts…”^[35]
“…since there is a law in the country, Muslims should obey it and be worthy citizens of that country.”^[36]

In the discussion “Clash of civilizations” from the subforum “Politics,”^[37] Russian-speaking migrants to the United Kingdom discuss whether the coexistence of different cultures could be fruitful. The majority of participants share the opinion that all countries neighboring Russia are either waiting to start, or have already started territorial expansion; these countries allegedly promote emigration of their citizens to Russia. Participants consider this to be an intervention that will soon result in Russia being robbed or deprived of its territories. Even having a foreign country as a neighbour is understood as a potential danger:

“…bringing low quality labor force [to Russia] from alien cultures causes more harm than benefits. I would agree with you on that.”^[38]

Here the expression “alien cultures” is used in lieu of other (non-Russian) races or ethnicities. The author believes that immigration to Russia of low-skilled migrants is not harmful unless the newcomers differ from the local population ethnically (i.e., the native population of Russia is perceived as culturally and ethnically homogeneous). The author believes that the culture of these migrants is defined by their ethnicity rather than their social status or education.
During the discussion the participants highlighted their understanding of Europeanism as being associated with a democratic way of governance, but at the same time they also associated democracy with territory. Native territory, the inherent value of “land,” emerges in the discussion as basic, generic and indisputable – almost sacred, and democracy is associated exclusively with Europe as a territory:

“Does it make sense for Europeans to match with Dubai? …Those who want so may remain living in Europe under European laws; those who don’t want – should get back to grazing camels.”^[39]

It should be noted that the messages concerning civic identities and the rights and responsibilities of an individual in a democratic society contain a relatively large number of English words, which is unusual for a forum famous for pedantically monitoring the use of foreign languages in communications: “minority communities,” “host society,” “social alienation,” “awareness,” “history,” “democratic values and culture of the British society,” “social awareness and benefits of cultural diversity.” The use of English rather than Russian in these posts can be attributed to the migrants having only been socialized in these norms following the emigration from their native territory. These norms are shared and even customized by migrants, yet democratic concepts exist as a separate discourse in their identity. This is another example of dualism or internal contradictions within the identity of Russian speaking migrants. It has been noted earlier that when discussing the issue of ethnicity, Russian-speaking migrants create different standards demonstrated in the special rights of particular traditions within certain territories. While conducting recent research into Russian political elites, James Billington concluded that the internal contradictions within the identity of contemporary Russians represents a special feature of the political situation in the post-Soviet space, where “the tensions and contradictions… do not seem to lie between groups so much as within individuals…”^[40] It is also possible to speculate that migrants use English in such situations to distantiate their identity as Russian-born, Russian-socialized and Russian-speaking from their identity as an individuals settled in Britain. The coexistence of separate and partly contradictory discourses within the same identity should not be interpreted as a specifically Russian phenomenon or confined to multilingual identities. For example, Susan Chase, in her research on women school superintendents in the United States, identified that two major cultural discourses were used: one that stressed their accomplishments in their professional life and the other which consisted of experiences of racial or gender discrimination. Chase noted that the women easily used either discourse, but became confused when they had to combine the two. Chase concluded that “the talk about professional work and talk about inequality belong to two different discursive realms, two conflicting vocabularies for articulating experience…”^[41]
As it has been shown above, Europe and Europeanism were defined and discussed in several dimensions (cultural, civic, religious, territorial), and forum participants evoked these concepts in thematically divergent discussions. The notion of “the West” is used sporadically and encompases different meanings. In one case, during the thread “Are the Germans right?” “the West” appears for the first time only on the eleventh day of the thread (April 22, 2004). A participant called Foreigner (a Russian-speaker from Estonia) believes that the process of integration in the case of Russian migrants represents an ongoing opportunity for Russian culture to borrow from and adapt to the host territory’s culture. Foreigner labels Russians as “we backward Europeans,” and introduces the concept of mimicry of Western European achievements (acquire from Western Europeans ).^[42] Later in the discussion Foreigner self-identifies as an Eastern European. Foreigner associates Russian history with “rigidity and Asianness” (i.e., “Asian” as a primitive and cruel way of life) and expresses solidarity with the ideas of 19th century “Westerners” by quoting from an unidentified author:

“…it is the task of Russia, the backward, ignorant, semi-barbarian country that only at the time of Peter the Great entered the path of cultural development common to all mankind, to get rid of its rigidity and Asianness and, joining the European West, merge with the one-all-mankind cultural family.”^[43]

Thereafter in the thread, the notion of “the West” is used in the discussion along with the notion of “Europeanism,” but encapsulates different ideas. This part of the thread demonstrates that while the discussion has conceived of Europe as an ideal state of culture and a democratic political structure, the notion of “the West” bears negative connotations and reflects the traditional dilemma of “Russia versus the West”; and where the West is revealed as something hostile and vicious, and is mostly discussed in historical perspective and associated with material culture.

“And it was under Peter I that Russia became an empire. Everybody knows that he was sending people to study in the West, and it’s been said that many did not return back.^[44]
True, in the 13th–14th centuries the underdeveloped Europe had a negative trade balance backed by silver and gold. Hence the grubby and lice-ridden Europeans (well, they did not have bathhouses) were no authority in the 13th–14th c.”^[45]

As I have noted, contributors to the discussion unanimously self-identify as European when discussing the problems of migrants of other origins, but any comparison between Russia and the unspecified “West” or with the European Community encourages them to distinguish themselves from Europe. References to the ambiguous role of the West in Russian history leads (for the first time after several weeks of the thread) to a statement on the differences between the Russian and the Western mentality:

“Russian mentality is somewhat different, as you rightly noticed. “Perhaps” and resourcefulness (not to be confused with intellect ) are two interesting peculiarities of the national character. Explanations are abundant, but this is how it all came about historically.”^[46]

Historical and cultural confrontation with the West evokes ideas of “Eurasianism” and leads to the suggestion that a Eurasian Union be created with former Soviet Republics as member states:

“Russia needs to recuperate now and start building its own Eurasian Union. We won’t succeed alone. There are preliminary plans: Russia, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan – are firmly interlocked together economically.”^[47]

Thus, the discussions mark several understandings of Europeanism by Russian migrants to the United Kingdom:
• They identify themselves with the native population of the United Kingdom
• In the migrants’ opinion, traditions and culture are embedded within a certain territory. In search for the borders of “Europeanism” they emphasize the importance of “native territory.” Such territory is roughly described as “European countries” without further naming or distinguishing between them.
• Migrants discuss the role and place of Russian culture within the European tradition, and construct the culture of the “Other” as non-European. They tend to prioritize ethnic and regional features over the social nature of European culture.
• Participants primarily imagine European identity through a discourse of what is not European, implying that the idea of Europeanism is conceptually vague.

ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGIES: OTHER AND THE OTHER

Finally, this study focuses on various argumentative strategies used by migrants to construct an image of the “other,” and singles out several narratives that support these strategies.
Statements about European identity in terms of democratic and civic values are surprisingly often supported by ethnic arguments. I posit that such a system of argument is connected to the difficulties of perceiving diversity as being a natural and fertilizing social feature. Migrants discuss ethnic specificities in terms of normality and abnormality, downplaying the achievements of what they perceive to be non-European cultures. It will be shown here that migrants accept opposite strategies when they discuss diversity within the diaspora, as compared to differentiating an “us” from the host country.
There are two strategies for their argumentation. The first is to downplay national differences when participants discuss their ethnic origins and the nationally constructed post-Soviet reality. For example, one of the contributors to the thread Explorations of the meanings of the word nationality, taken from the thread “How it can help me?”^[48] states that there was no “ethnic question” in the former USSR (“it did not seem to be a problem to any one in our home country”).

“This problem bothered me for a while, but then I suddenly realized that it did not seem to be a problem to any one in our home country.”^[49]

Later in the same thread other participants agree, and define ethnic and national belonging as being self-ascribed, stating that they can represent the culture that they feel they belong to and can define their nationality according to their subjective interests:

“My nationality is not Russian, but Russian is my native tongue, as well as culture, and in my heart, I regard myself as a Russian.”^[50]
“Although I was born in Russia and am a Russian citizen and Russian by nationality, I don’t consider myself a Russian national [rossiianin], as I don’t reside in Russia and my interests and those of Russia are not closely connected…”^[51]

A similar strategy is used when Russian speaking migrants define their cultural differences with the host (“native British”) population. The thread “Three reasons why [I/we] do not like living in England”^[52] will illustrate this point. This discussion contains more than one thousand replies and was visited by more than sixty thousand viewers. The Russian-speaking migrants discussed various issues they do not like in the United Kingdom: media disinformation about Russia, bad coffee, expensive property, inefficient transport, silly humor on TV, poor health services, climate, taxes, etc. Drawing comparisons between their native culture and British culture, migrants pay attention to differences in approaches, habits, tastes, and lifestyle. But these differences appear as cultural diversity rather than contradictions or oppositions between the host population and the Russian speaking migrants. The discussants describe real-life situations and personal experiences, even quoting figures from their own personal finances. There are no links to external sources of information. The tone of the discussion is ironic and relaxed. The nature of the topic means that migrants discuss their life in Britain, and the host population is be expected to represent the Other. In fact, Russian-speaking migrants focused on ethnic divisions in the host country and conceptualized the Other as primarily migrants of non-European descent (rather than the Anglo-Saxon majority).
A different discursive strategy of national, ethnic and cultural differences emerges as soon as the community approaches the same issues in connection with the Other. “They” are immediately labeled as non-Europeans staying in the United Kingdom. Russian-speaking migrants distinguish themselves from these outsiders, even though they are also immigrants in the same country dealing with the same issues of disjunction within their identities. The participants highlight the importance of ethnic issues for this part of the British population, rather than downplay them. For example, one of the contributors compares his happily resolved personal dilemma of national and ethnic belonging with immigrants from India or Africa. He claims that they are guilty of escalating this question and alludes to their physical features as “primative.” They are described as uprooted people without a motherland who are not fully accepted by the host country, and this is the reason for their allegedly being desperate to institutionalize their belonging in the host country:

“In everyday life this question does not arise: “How to identify oneself?” Particularly, when a person lives in the same country where he was born and grew up. This question rather arises among immigrants from India and Africa, who have little in common with the country of their origin, except physical traits and skin color. Probably they are exasperated by the fact that they are not considered Englishmen, that’s why they introduced this nonsense: British nationality, ethnic origins...”^[53]

It is instructive to analyze the construction of the above argument. First of all the author distinguishes those who migrate from those who remain in their country of origin. The same division was drawn earlier in the discussion of the ethnic differentiation among Russian-speaking migrants. Next, the object of the discussion is specified: the author compares the Russian Diaspora with that of migrants of other origins. But out of all of the minority nationalities represented in the population of the United Kingdom today, only immigrants from Africa and India are chosen to illustrate his idea. The author is silent about migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe or from the United States who might also experience crises of national identity, and excludes them from the list of migrants preoccupied with their identity. He is also silent about the occupation and education of migrants from India and Africa, in contrast to conversations among Russian-speaking migrants who, when discussing their own identities, widely use allusions to their allegedly high social or educational status (e.g., “Once, on the website of one American university…” or “I look at my colleagues in other companies in the City”). This can be interpreted as a Foucauldian silence, implying that while the author identifies the Other with specific cultures or regions, he also assumes that they all come from the poorest “uncivilized” countries. “Strangers” are imagined not only as culturally different, but also inhabit lower social and financial statuses in the host society. Thus, by using the same indicators, participants construct the mirror image of Russian-speaking migrants. This “reflection” is also a migrant, but is non-European and of lower social status. As a result this mirror migrant (they) is not accepted (“they are not considered Englishmen”), not loyal (“they are exasperated”) and creates silly social projects (“they introduced this nonsense”).
The construction of the arguments differs from the aforementioned discussion on conflicts between Russian-speaking migrants and British cultural traditions. There are very few personal stories and cases discussed.^[54] Instead contributors use generalizations, appeal to third-party knowledge, and quote media sources or provide links to them. Messages are emotional and contradictory. The differences between European and non-European in the migrants’ discourse emerge as a dilemma between normality and abnormality, in the same vein as a Foucauldian structure of surveillance and discipline. Foucault examines in a historical perspective how governing agencies have constructed categories of normality and abnormality in order to draw boundaries between individuals and groups and exercise power over them.^[55]The following demonstrates that in the on-line discussions, migrants themselves police these boundaries because the categories define their social identities, which in turn determine how they relate to the native culture.
The following example shows that Russian-speaking migrants practice double standards in their attitude towards asocial behavior depending on one’s social status, which is symbolically marked by ethnicity. For example, Kotiara notes in her message that only African emigrants speak loudly on public transport, and she is annoyed by their behavior:

“Loudly yelling Negroes in buses irritate me (just Negroes, as all the others sit quietly).”^[56]

Another participant, Tormenta, adds referring to these same migrants as Them, that they tend to sit far away from each other, forcing everybody else on the bus to become spectators of their conversation:

“They (Negroes) also like to take seats in the subway car in opposite rows, diagonally, so that as many people as possible can enjoy their shouting.”^[57]

They are confronted by a moderator, Lawyer, who mentioned that such behavior is also typical of Italian tourists, drunken builders from Baltic countries, white British teenagers and football fans.^[58]According to the Russian concept of “being cultured,” Lawyer qualifies such people as “uncultured.”
He receives a reply extrapolating such behavior to all Africans and stressing their “otherness” from Europeans.

“I repeat: screaming Italians and representatives of other European nations are an exception, while Negroes jumping out of their pants – is a rule (with only a small percentage of exception).”^[59]

The respondent generalizes her experiences, categorizes exceptions and rules, uses an insulting metaphor (“jumping out of their pants”) and shows no respect to Lawyer who has tried to challenge her opinion (“I repeat”).
Migrants of “non-European decent” emerge in these posts as low-paid workers or socially inactive individuals who break the rules of civilized behavior (“they work as janitors and let them do this, no one humiliate them”). Hence, ethnic arguments hide the social aspect of this problem.
My argument is that the ethnic predicates in the above discussion mainly substitute for social markers. For example, participants also express their dislike of migrants originating from the former USSR when they are “of low class,” meaning that they are uncultured, provincial, low skilled and badly paid.

“Strecozavr: [I do not like] Large quantity of migrant low class, which did not find a place for themselves in their homeland.”^[60]

Another contributor acknowledges that migrants create polarized and contested social spaces in their host communities. Participant Antonio Rosso posts to the same discussion:

“Frankly speaking, I am more irritated by the increased number of immigrants from Eastern Europe, particularly in recent times. However I wouldn’t make a big issue out of this.”^[61]

Rosso is annoyed with large number of migrants from the Eastern Europe, which he describes as “higher than normal”. He does not give any reasons for that, but one can speculate that the high number of newcomers challenges in some way his privileged or stable situation. The participants often use the verb “annoy” (36 times during the discussion) to describe their feelings. It signifies that they either do not understand the reasons for their attitudes, or deny the reasons behind their feelings.
The above argumentative strategies are structured through several narratives that will be briefly discussed here.
A narrative of the superiority of Europeans, and the advanced development and long history of Europe (without distinguishing its separate countries) is present in the discussion. The following arguments are posted by an user named Defi after he confronts a participant’s message that “Islam is the XX [sic] century plague”; Defi argues that Islam is historically young and therefore prone to radical tendencies. In his post Christianity emerges as one of the alternative social instruments of the contemporary world, which is historically older and has outgrown its radicalism.

“Defi: Please don’t forget that Islam is 500-600 years younger than Christianity, and is passing through the same stage of its development, as Christianity did in the 15th-16th centuries. Remember the deeds of the Church at that time? Inquisition that degenerated into the indiscriminate extermination of all dissidents, the fighting of heretics, witch-hunting, intolerance toward other religions, etc. These all disappeared with time, and now the Christian church represents an alternative spiritual institute in contemporary society that plays quite a benign and certainly not bloody role.”^[62]

Comparing Islam with the Medieval Inquisition and the witch-hunting of that time, Defi constructs his arguments in a patronizing way; he excuses the radicalism of Muslims because of the relative newness of their faith. Further in his post the author extrapolates this condescending attitude to Africans. Moreover, he attributes all human developments to Europeans “a context of western (predominantly white) civilization.” Defi uses the passive voice in connection with African participation in world development, stating that “Africans have been included” in world progress in the recent past. He highlights the successes of people of African descent in sports, music and art, but patronizingly assigns them to a lower stage of cultural development: “they did not have enough time to cultivate appropriate cultural tendencies.”

“An utterly one-sided judgment of the Negro race. Remember that not so much time has passed since the Negro had been included into the context of Western (predominantly white) civilization as equals. And if the percentage of Negroes among the brightest scientists is lower than that of whites so far, this is because they did not have enough time to cultivate appropriate cultural tendencies. But how talented they are in music, arts, and sport! While every nationality has enough scum and punks.”^[63]

The author unconsciously reproduces the missionary, imperial narratives of pity and support for the indigenous peoples of non-European territories who allegedly stand on the lower steps of the imagined stairs of human development. Therefore such a monologue strengthens Defi’s self-identification with a high social status: as a more civilized, fully cultured person, belonging to a longstanding national tradition within European culture. Therefore, the above narratives help to justify the ideas of the Russian-speaking migrants’ sense of self and community superiority.
The nostalgic narratives of Russian speaking migrants idealize the country of residence, rather than their home countries. They construct an ideal image of the United Kingdom and Europe, but this ideal is located in an imagined past. Migrants dream about a Britain they have never directly experienced, but one that they are familiar with through their education: the traditional, white Britain of Shakespeare and Dickens. For example, Spouse writes:

“Debates on this topic have calmed down, but I want to say why immigrants displease ME. By the way, those from Asia and Africa as much as from Russia and Ukraine. I think… that is, very much IMHO… that immigrants alter the outlook of the “good, old Britain,” Afro-Asian ones to a greater degree, Russian-speaking and others to a lesser. There is too much of this “multiculturalism,” at least in London. I perfectly understand that this is a consequence of the colonial past, but nevertheless.”^[64]

The author compares the contemporary “multicultural” realities of mass migration with an image of “good, old Britain” and praises the latter as his ideal (“the one I would love to see here”). Spouse then denies the existence of any positive aspects of cultural diversity, seeing it purely as the result of a colonial past. In one phrase the author writes that African and Asian migrants contribute more to the change of a country’s image, presumably alluding to racial differences. But in the next sentence Spouse contradicts his own idea, and underlines that migrants from Russia and Ukraine are strangers here just as much as those from Africa and Asia.
Another participant is annoyed (again) and feels deceived by not finding the country he expected to see:

“The fact that I found myself in a totally different country from the one where I was planning to go really annoys me. Although nobody dragged me here – but nevertheless – “teaspoons have been recovered but a bitter feeling remains”.”^[65]

The fact that the image of the United Kingdom praised by Russian migrants is related to the past is an important feature of the on-line identity discourse, and rooted in a nostalgia of culture and tradition. Contemporary European realities are perceived through the idealized image of the European past – and in this case, especially British – traditions and authority.
It is also important to point out that various contributors assume that their nostalgia for a Britain without immigrants is shared by “all” the ethnically-native population. For example,

“Defi: I am sure that Englishmen can say exactly the same about the influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe.”^[66]
“Spouse: In my opinion, this should be disliked first of all by the “native Anglo-Saxons”.”^[67]

Such assumptions could also be interpreted as a desire by Russian-speaking migrants to self-identify with the “rightful” population of the United Kingdom, thus supporting their claims of belonging to the European cultural tradition.
Summarizing the argumentative strategies of Russian speaking migrants, it can be seen that migrants demonstrate a general lack of awareness of how to deal with and appreciate differences. They reproduce a variety of so-called unstated assumptions which remain unnoticed and without reflection in the discourse, through which they reinforce their identity. Their statements are based on privileges and power positions of the past, which may have vanished but still influence consciousness. Migrants protect their identity by policing concepts of what is and what is not normal through these assumptions. In a way, the participants reproduce the discourse of supremacy that was typical for late nineteenth century imperial Europe,^[68] when after the cultural transformations of the Enlightenment “the newly confident largely bourgeois elites [in the age of empire] came increasingly to see their societies as unique in the human panorama, owing to the special significance.”^[69] Participants to the web-forums create a mirror image of the “Other” to strengthen their ideas of their own social, moral and cultural prominence. Their alleged belonging to Europe becomes for them the most important indicator of their status and position of power, and forms the basis for their ambition to succeed in the new society.
At the same time it is important to remember that although the Russian-speaking migrants to the United Kingdom discourse differences through binary and value-laded oppositions, their strategies of othering are at least three folded and complicated by differentiating between positive “internal” others (former compatriots), positive external others (native British population), and an imagined negative external other.