This collection of short essays, mainly focused on the domestic politics of unrecognized states, covers the period until autumn of 2006, when the September referendum in Transnistria confirmed the Puerto Rican model for its future association with Russia, and when Nagorny Karabakh was preparing for the referendum to confirm the long-awaited constitution. As anticipated, these referendums provoked nothing but accusations from international organizations, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Observers took these accusations no more seriously than the referendums themselves, viewing both as standard practice, aimed at glossing over the diplomatic incompetence of both parties in the conflict. The conflicts concerning unrecognized states were not only frozen but, moreover, being steadily forgotten. The international recognition of Kosovo, the South Ossetian conflict in August 2008, and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia drastically changed this static situation, reigniting public interest in this issue.
A number of scholars have focused on the domestic politics of unrecognized states.^[1] Although the publications of this group have understandably been much fewer in number than the those analyzing the international implications of the issue, they are not inferior in quality. They seem more balanced, empirical, and less politicized than those focused on international aspects. Nevertheless, previous comparisons of the domestic politics of unrecognized states appear sketchy. A merit of the collection reviewed here is that it scrutinizes the logic of political development in the unrecognized polities, rather than comparing them according to standardized criteria.
The first element of this political logic, which the reviewed collection compellingly discerns, is the significance of democracy for the survival of these states. Even insignificant deviation from democratic norms, which could be tolerated for Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and other recognized states, can be used as a pretext to liquidate them (Pp. 105, 158). It is widely admitted that the unrecognized states “voluntarily implemented a number of international standards applying to de jure states.”^[2] Sergei Markedonov, one of the authors of this collection, notes that Karabakh is most ardent in this approach. While Transnistria’s understanding of democracy strongly hints at a Soviet-style plebiscite,^[3]Karabakh is attempting to adopt the principles of ordinary liberal democracy. This factor may be caused by Karabakh’s privileged status in international politics. Through the Armenian Diaspora, Karabakh is able to influence American and European public opinion – an advantage inconceivable for the other unrecognized states. Armenia receives dozens of messages from U.S. congressmen each year on April 24 (the anniversary of the 1915 Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire). To exploit this advantage, Karabakh tries to avoid one-sided reliance on Russia and to gain international recognition by distinguishing itself from the other unrecognized states, and not acting in solidarity with them (P. 105).
The unrecognized states’ inclination toward democracy has faced international and domestic challenges. It is not difficult to discern the intentions of the EU, OSCE, and other international organizations in their strange criticisms concerning any election or referendum conducted in the unrecognized states. The behavior of these organizations even gives an impression that these “defenders of democracy” are requesting the peoples of the contested territories to live without elections, constitutions, courts, and other human rights protections twenty years after their de facto secession from the mother countries. The international organizations correctly understand that the more democratic and, accordingly, legitimate the unrecognized states become, the more difficult it will be to “solve” this issue. A leader of the Karabakh opposition Gegam Bagdasaryan, chairman of the Stepanakert press club, points out a de facto alliance between the international organizations and authoritarian forces in the unrecognized states.
Domestic challenges to democratization in the unrecognized states derive from the psychological aftereffects of the civil wars. The addiction to wartime heroism has made it difficult for the population to adapt to normal civil democracy and a market economy. The populations of these states preferred to delegate power to heroes of the wars for independence, such as Samvel Babayan, Vladislav Ardzinba, and Igor Smirnov. Cronies and relatives of these leaders exploited the situation, concentrating wealth and power in their hands. Since the Karabakh War was most devastating among the three civil wars, its aftereffects were extremely harmful, generating something akin to a “federation of field commanders” in Chechnya (P. 14).
When the opposition tried to protest against negative phenomena in the postwar period, they had two main options for appealing to the population. The first was the recovery of the founding ideals of the state, a return to belligerent democracy. Since the aftereffects of the war were most significant in Karabakh, this discourse of “return” emerged there most typically. The veterans of the Karabakh War emerged as both supporters of and protestors against the former commanders’ “dictatorship.” The protestors raised the slogan: “Don’t surrender the freedom acquired at the cost of blood.” It was not by chance that the oppositions in Karabakh and Abkhazia named their parties based on the concept of “return” or “recovery”: Movement-88 in Karabakh and Aitaira (Rebirth) in Abkhazia, whereas in Transnistria, where atrocities and violence during the war were limited, the opposition named itself Obnovlenie (Innovation).
The slogans for a return to belligerent democracy proved to be only temporarily effective. After instating the Bagapsh administration in 2004, Aitaira in Abkhazia faded out. Having achieved impressive success in the local elections in Karabakh in 2004, as a result of which Movement-88 gained the mayoralty of the state capital of Stepanakert (note that Karabakh is the only state in the South Caucasus, whether de jure or de facto, in which the mayor of the state capital is elected, and not appointed by the president), this party was completely defeated in the 2005 parliamentary elections and practically split on the eve of the 2007 presidential elections.
The second option for redemocratization was to appeal for multinationalism, which proved to be more enduring than the attempts to return to belligerent democracy. Transnistria has the longest, most consistent tradition of multiethnic state building. Transnistria did not create internally displaced persons, in contrast to Karabakh and Abkhazia (P. 107). From the very beginning of the secessionist movement, Transnistrian leaders endeavored to distinguish left-bank Moldovans from their co-ethnics on the right bank. In right-bank Moldova during the late 1980s and early 1990s, rampant pan-Romanian nationalism resulted in the denial of the very existence of the Moldovan nation and language. Therefore, it was not difficult for Transnistrian leaders to describe the newly born polity as the last bastion not only of the Russophone and Ukrainophone populations but also of Moldovans. When the left-bank Moldovans participated in the armed resistance against Moldovan troops, in solidarity with ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, the result of this war was predetermined.
In 1998, the Abkhazian authorities began to follow the Transnistrian scenario by calling the former Mingrelian population of Gal District, the southeast extreme of Abkhazia bordering on Georgia, to return from the refugee camps of Georgia to their native land. Markedonov calls this act Abkhazia’s “New Eastern Policy” (Pp. 115-116). The next stage of multinational state building in Abkhazia was the victory of Sergei Bagapsh, supported by the Gal Mingrelians, in the 2004 presidential election (P. 117). President Bagapsh continued this strategy to win the 2007 parliamentary elections, by proposing to raise the proportion of deputies of Armenian and Slavic origin.^[4]
Monoethnic Karabakh cannot adopt multinational democracy. Having benefited more than the others from the idea of returning to belligerent democracy, Karabakh lacks the conditions for multiethnic state building, since the harshness of the Karabakh War did not leave the non-Armenian population in its territory. Up to a certain moment, Karabakh leaders even tried to persuade the Azeris not to leave the republic if they were ready to be obedient citizens of the Armenian Karabakh state, let alone other traditional populations, such as the Greeks and Russians, to whom various privileges were promised. All these measures failed and 95 percent of the present Karabakh population is Armenian, which creates tremendous predicaments not only for its international recognition but also for state building. Markedonov calls this peculiar Karabakh democracy “ethnodemocratization” (P. 159). Laurence Broers echoes Markedonov: “This [ethnic homogenization of Nagorny Karabakh through the deportation of the Azeri population] removed a key political cleavage, enabling a certain core consensus on the existence and purpose of the resulting de facto state. However, it has also closed off a potential avenue for the articulation of a civic rather than ethnic sense of membership; although multiethnic Abkhazia has yet to reap genuine democratic dividends from incorporating minorities, their existence in itself creates political space for competing visions of Abkhazian statehood. In Karabakh ethnic homogenization has shut off debates on the nature of political membership and underpinned the effacement of a Karabakh Azeri identity.”^[5]
Relative indifference to the domestic politics of the unrecognized states has been motivated by a desire, shared by their former suzerains and the international organizations, to depict them as puppets of Russia or Armenia. This notion continues to be convenient to construct and justify their policy. On the other hand, this attitude reminds us of the notorious declaration of the Konoe Fumimaro government of Japan in 1938, which refused to recognize the Jiǎng Jièshí government as an entity for peace talks. We all know the results, but history can be repeated. This collection’s analyses of the domestic politics of unrecognized states reveal not only that the topic involves conflictology, but also that it has academic potential to stimulate comparative studies of political regimes, ethnic discourse, and trauma after severe civil wars.