It is never easy to write an account of historical occurrences. It is more difficult to do so when the events haven’t yet become real history: the dust of time hasn’t settled, the main participants are alive and active, the available information is incomplete and controversial. It is even more problematic when the history of the time is ‘packed’ with momentous choices and fundamental changes that unrecognizably transformed the shape of the nation and the world.
Roy Medvedev, a famous Russian historian, acknowledges these difficulties but nevertheless takes on the task of providing such an account of Russian history during the so-called Yeltsin era, the last decade of the 20th century. Vivid and gripping language guides the reader through the Yeltsin decade; through the turbulence of the political and economic reforms and the upheavals of social and cultural transformations. The reader can not help but sympathize with the sorrowful fate of millions of Russians impoverished and abandoned in the course of the transformation.
In Medvedev’s own words, the goal of the book is “to outline and analyze the main events in the Russian Federation since August 1991” with a primary focus on 1991-95, but also covering some key events from the late 80s and the late 90s (p. 6). The form of idiosyncratic narration that he chooses unavoidably poses the question of authorial objectivity and value judgment. Personal interests and biases can substantially alter eyewitnesses’ testimonies. They can make accounts of the same events dissimilar to a degree where it is hard to guess that they are describing the same phenomenon. While total objectivity of narration is an unattainable mirage and any even most ‘scientifically rigorous’ analysis is never value-free, the attempt on behalf of the scientist to step outside the narrow window of personal subjectivity helps to enhance the credibility of the storytelling. It allows one to obtain a different perspective, to anticipate and incorporate the alternative arguments and to enrich the description of the matter at hand.
Medvedev acknowledges the subjectivity of his narration, but since in his opinion any account of events is unavoidably subjective, he does not try to rid the text of his value judgments. Although it is good to have a strong moral stance, it is not at all beneficial for the author to superimpose his values and views on the audience, leaving no space for the reader’s independent conclusions. The tone of the narration, derogatory with regard to Yeltsin’s reforms and uncritical and utopian with regard to his own views and beliefs at times makes the book resemble a political pamphlet or party document rather than a serious historical analysis. The credibility of the book is damaged by the straightforward moralization and the straight-jacketing of personalities and events. In addition, the strong moral emphasis of the book should make readers skeptical and suspicious both about the accuracy of ‘facts’ and the validity of their interpretation. Those who share Medvedev’s feelings towards Yeltsin and the ‘reformers’ are probably not in need of persuasion, and those who do not agree with Medvedev’s opinion may be deterred by the unmasked prejudice of the author and made unwilling to listen even to reasonable arguments (of which Medvedev, to his credit, has plenty).
The scholar feels that his subjectivity is compensated by the tendency to pose questions instead of giving the answers. He indeed raises many important questions, including the Russian traditional questions “who is to blame?” and “what is to be done?” However, most of the questions are immediately followed by rather categorical answers: sometimes lengthy, sometimes partial. Once again, the moral choice guides the narrative and dictates the interpretation of the events and the choice of the argumentation.
The book consists of three parts and a postscript which are structured along the main developments in Russian history of the reforms. Part One deals with first half of Yeltsin’s reign. It is explicit in assigning the blame for the failure of the reforms and drastic decline in people’s well-being to the mistakes and miscalculations of the reformers headed by Gaidar and supported by Yeltsin. In this part, Medvedev composes a list of “ten factors impeding capitalist revolution in Russia” (p. 51) and argues about the impossibility and detrimental consequences of Western capitalism in Russia. Part Two focuses on the elections of 1995-96 and elaborates on the details of the personality and the political program of G. Ziuganov, the leader of Russian Communist Party. It concludes with Medvedev’s own vision of the correct course of action and possible scenarios of the future. Part Three and the postscript contain a sketchy outline of the events in Russia since the elections of 1996 up until Yeltsin’s resignation in December 1999, highlighting the financial collapse of 1998, Chechen war and Putin’s rise to power.
Unfortunately, primarily due to bad editing, the chapters and the parts of the book are not properly bridged and often contain inconsistent statements. The fact that the book was ‘assembled’ from different manuscripts written at different periods of time with different goals in mind and containing different lines of argumentation becomes apparent once the reader reaches to the second part of the book: the logic, the language, and the style of the first part is noticeably different from the rest of the book. The account of the events since 1996 contained in Part Three and the Postscript provide a brief and rather shallow analysis of the developments. Obviously this was done to update the book and to keep it more in line with recent events. However, it was clearly done in a hurry and in a very schematic manner substantially different from the language and the style of previous chapters.
The absence of logical cohesion adds to the numerous already-existing inconsistencies and contradictions in the arguments. This is most apparent in Medvedev’s attitude towards Western ideas and their adaptability in Russia. For instance, in the first part of the book a great deal of his anti-capitalist argument is based on the modern slavophilism that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russian cultural traditions, reinforced by the uniqueness of the Soviet experience. On the other hand, in the second part of the book, offering democratic socialism as an appropriate solution for Russia, Medvedev sees it as the recipe and indeed the destiny of the whole world in general. Thus, it seems that Russian culture has a particular dislike to the western notion of capitalism whereas it fits without trouble to another Western idea of democracy. This is a contradiction that both Western and Russian scholars are eager to point out.^[1]
Another contradictory position with regard to the West and Western ideas is manifested once again when the scholar speaks about the activity of foreign capital in Russia (chapter 4). The main tone of his writing is negative; he is very critical of the openness of Russian economy, he views most of the foreign activity as predatory and advocates strong governmental protectionism and regulation. At the same time Medvedev complains about the very low level of foreign direct investment in the country and acknowledges that in order to overcome a crisis and start growth, Russia’s economy needs much more, not less, foreign capital.
Major and minor inconsistencies and contradictions that one encounters in the book are partially explained by a very eclectic choice of methodology (see below). This complicates the appreciation of the main argument, which is more than simply negation of the reforms and the transition. The structure of the book looks different once one interprets the sequential description of the events mainly as a vehicle for the communication of Medvedev’s own worldview and his own vision for the ‘remedy’ needed for Russia.
The key to the deciphering of Medvedev’s main message is in his ontology, which in essence is Marxism with some modifications and updates. The history of humankind is perceived as a progressive sequence of socioeconomic formations that “are governed by inner laws of operation, not by the desires or endeavors of legislators and/or reformers” (p. 51). In this system, socialism embodies a superior, more progressive form of human civilization than capitalism. The attempt to build capitalism in Russia represents a clear ‘regress,’ a step backwards in the development of Russia. According to Medvedev, the model of socialism that existed in the USSR was not ideal, and had many drawbacks, but was reformable in principle: it required slow and gradual modifications, not abrupt destruction. The ideal towards which Russia and apparently the world as a whole should be aspiring, according to Medvedev, is “a new, humane, and democratic socialism” (p. 275).
Through this ontological prism the history of the last ten years in Russia is viewed and depicted as a testimony to Medvedev’s (Marx’s?) correctness. All the arguments and facts are composed in such a way as to support the view that capitalism is wrong, unsuitable and damaging to Russia. Probably his firm belief in his worldview can explain the choice of the style: the events are depicted in a vivid but straightforward manner. No historical secrets, no controversies exist in Medvedev’s narration. Even thoughts and perceptions of other people are presented as unambiguous facts rather than the interpretations and guesses of the author. Overall, the scholar does not hesitate to describe his vision of the events as correct, objective and uncontroversial.
At the same time Medvedev’s book would have benefited if the author had made his ontological position explicit rather than keeping it in the background. Among other things, it would have pushed him to provide clear-cut definitions and to eliminate logical contradictions. For instance, if the objective law guides the change of the formations, how was it possible to build socialism in a pre-capitalist Russia? If it was not socialism that was built in the USSR, then contemporary capitalist reforms is not a step backwards but rather a move forward. If one accepts that the Soviet regime was in fact socialism, albeit imperfect, then the laws of history (if they exist) are more complicated than Marx thought, and human factors (revolutionaries, legislators, reformers, etc.) might have an important impact on history.
Another disadvantage is the ambiguity of the very concept of socialism, and its subgenre of humane socialism. Medvedev speaks about ideas of socialism that will inspire people, but he never actually defines the concept of socialism, or of capitalism for that matter. From numerous remarks, one can guess that new ‘humane socialism’ embraces democracy, justice, and prosperity – values most of us adhere to. At the same time, the means to those goals is a socialist economy based on central planning and the predominance of public property – a thesis difficult to ‘digest’ given Soviet history of totalitarianism and modern theories of democracy, which condition democracy to the economic pluralism of the market.
The assumption of the ‘reformability’ of the Soviet economy plays an important role in Medvedev’s criticism of Russia’s radical capitalist transformation. For historians and social scientists this is a controversial issue. Often proponents of the gradualist approach will point to the Chinese experience as an example of successful modernization of the economy. It is argued that the ‘Chinese way’ was applicable to the Soviet realities and would have resulted in a faster, better pace of reforms, economic growth, and the preservation of the integrity of the country and of the Communist Party. The American scholar Steven Solnick, utilizing the principle-agent model of neo-Institutionalism, argues that the crucial difference between Russian and Chinese reforms was in the role and the integrity of the Communist party, which preserved its leading role and dominant power in the Chinese society but lost its credibility and strength in Russia.^[2] Medvedev cites Yuri Yaremenko, a vocal proponent of gradual reforms in Russia, who emphasized the key role of the Communist party in the success of economic amendments.
However, not everybody agrees that the Chinese way was applicable and that the Soviet economy was reformable. On the one hand, agricultural China was very different from industrial Soviet society. China enjoyed the ‘advantages of its backwardness’^[3] that resulted in the absence of any organized opposition to reforms and allowed the mobilization of all resources necessary for a quick restructuring of the economy. The USSR was in the similar situation in the 1930s, during Stalin’s drive to industrialization. The industrially developed USSR of the late 70s-early 80s faced grave opposition from numerous interest groups lobbying for defense, heavy machinery, and resource extraction sectors. Political liberalization and the weakening of the Party bureaucracy were necessary to bring new constituencies to the reform-oriented wing of the Party and to create a winning coalition for the reforms. Thus Gorbachev’s glasnost’ preceded economic changes simply because there was no other way.
On the other hand, leaving the analogy with China aside, it should be emphasized that the Communist Party constituted a fundamental element in the Communist regime.^[4] It was a machine that supervised all spheres of life, ensured ideological, political, economic, and social control of society. It was a glue that bonded society, and the glue whose presence was essential for the survival of the regime. The glasnost’ policy of Gorbachev crippled the might of the Party, undermined its credibility as a ‘principal’ and let the ‘agency’ loose in the jungle of lucrative opportunities. Therefore, one can argue that after Yeltsin seized power as a result of the conservatives’ failed coup, the Communist party was banned, and the dissolution of the USSR became a reality, slow and gradual changes in the economy were no longer feasible, as the economy was already in deep crisis, with no mechanism for efficient control over the economy and the traditional chains of production in pieces. The Soviet economy, as an integral part of the Soviet society, could not possibly survive the collapse of the political and administrative structures. Thus gradual and slow reform with long deliberations might not have been an option at the time. At the same time, a very interesting idea in the book is about the necessity of separate reform designs for different sectors of the economy (p. 57). The problems with Medvedev’s ontology are reinforced by a mix-and-match approach to the choice of the methodology and argumentation. The eclectic and inconsistent methodology encourages the subjectivity of narration as well as an obvious bias in choosing facts and their interpretations. Defying his ontological determinism (which believes in the existence of objective laws in history) Medvedev reverts to voluntarism, blaming economic and social troubles almost exclusively on Yeltsin and his government. In his analysis of key decision-making of the government and the opposition he falls into a classical psychological trap: the propensity to attribute the mistakes of people whom one dislikes to their personal traits and their own miscalculations and, in contrast, the mistakes of the people one sympathizes with to the environment, and unfortunate circumstances. By the same token, the successes of ‘friends’ are acknowleded as personal achievement and work, whereas opponents’ achievements are presented as the product of the environment and luck, rather than hard work or talent.
Therefore, Medvedev portrays a constraint-free environment for the choices made by Yeltsin’s ‘reformers’ and exclusively blames their incompetence and misperceptions for the failures. Seemingly abandoning the deterministic perspective, Medvedev denies politics its political dimension of bargains and tradeoffs: the reformers are operating in an obstacle-free world. They are free to proceed with any of their projects. The only obstacle is the incompatibility of the reforms with the Russian society per se; the latter sooner or later will somehow reject the inadequate alien solutions. No serious examination of political forces and pressures, coalitions and bargains is included in the analysis of why particular reforms were chosen and the way the were implemented. Perhaps the famous Olsonean metaphor of ‘collective action problem’^[5] could be of help in accounting for the choices and their consequences. This would help identify the importance of regional politics, which is barely acknowledged in the book. The position of regional leaders, as well as powerful pressure from agricultural and industrial lobbies, were at some point crucial for the fate of the reforms and for the choices of central decision-makers.
In contrast to the description of right-wing politicians, commenting on Chernomyrdin’s first year in power or Primakov’s premiership, the scholar lists various external factors to explain failures and the absence of noticeable improvements. By the same token, he views tragic circumstances as crucial in the defeat of the opposition during the president-parliament confrontation in October 1993. One of the circumstances was the surprising indifference of the population, who in majority were passive observers of the conflict. Interestingly enough, the same people are portrayed as angered voters who, despite powerful pro-government propaganda, wisely voted for the opposition in the parliamentary elections only two months after the events in question.
Of course, every historical narration is unique and reflects with necessity the views and values of the author and of the time. As Medvedev rightfully notes, in the long run a historical narrative is still the primary basis for future historical writings that will have subjective biases of their own. However, a conscious attempt on behalf of the scholar to control his emotions and to acknowledge self limitations helps to enrich the narration, and to raise the credibility and to strengthen the cohesion of the narration. Medvedev’s book, full of interesting details, strong critical arguments, statistics and quotations, would have benefited a great deal from it.