This collection of nine articles written by experts from the Russian Academy of Science explores how ethnic nationalism affects the dynamics of state building in Tatarstan, Dagestan, North Ossetia, the Crimea, and Kazakhstan. It contributes to an on-going theoretical debate about the role of nationalism in state building.^[1] First, I will briefly outline this debate. Second, I will discuss several articles from this collection and relate their findings to the debate.
There are two leading theoretical approaches conceptualizing the roles of nations and nationalisms in state building. First, the “primordialist” approach conceives nations as cultural creations that come into being before the state. Individuals are “born” into nations. They maintain the spirit of the nation, even if they are not aware of it. Nations “survive” political realities and changing political structures. Thus, when new states are born, the feeling of nationalism can serve as a social “glue,” the center of collective identity and (possibly) as a powerful tool of exclusion. The second approach (the “constructivists”) sees nations as a product of numerous complex social interactions that lead to the creation of “imagined communities” (Benedict Anderson’s term). Many of these interactions can be shaped for political gains. According to the second perspective, political elites can create nations, and they often do. The second approach suggests that states can re-shape exclusionary forms of nationalism and strive to promote ethnic toleration.
These two leading approaches are based on the experience of Western Europe (the first one is usually associated with the German experience of state building in the 19th century, the second one with the French experience in the 18th century). This book explores similar relationships between nationalism and state building using case studies from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Several articles in this collection deal with very narrow, specialized historical topics that are only somewhat relevant to the main theme of the volume (e.g., Irina Yerofeyeva’s “The Slavic Population of Eastern Kazakhstan from the 18th to the 20th Century: Migration, Stages of Socio-cultural Evolution, Issues of Repatriation” and Anatoly Vyatkin’s “The Crimean Tatars Attempt at State Reconstruction: The Historic Lessons of 1917-1918”), although every article in this collection has some new and interesting data useful for future research.
The authors of the articles in this collection use several different research methodologies to explore the relationship between ethnic nationalism and state building. For example, Sergei Panarin’s “Youth, Nationalism, and Security in Russia and Kazakhstan” uses sociological surveys. Andrei Grozin’s “The Republic of Kazakhstan in Search of an Official Ideology” and Ekaterina Borisova’s “The Institution of the Presidency in Kazakhstan” use official document and policy analysis. Vadim Tsymburskii’s “North Ossetia in the First Half of the 1990s: A Search for Statehood from Geopolitical and Socio-Functionalist Perspectives” uses a case study approach. Vladimir Bobrovnikov’s “Islamophobia and Religious Legislation in Post-Soviet Dagestan” describes the attitudes of political elites toward radical religious ideology.
Sergei Panarin’s “Youth, Nationalism and Security in Russia and Kazakhstan” sets out to explore the relationship between age and nationalism in different regions of Russia and Kazakhstan. It would appear that nations with memories of mass deportations create very exclusionary, lethal forms of nationalism. Panarin rightly asks about the role of young people in nationalist movements. His reasoning can be summarized as follows: If young people are attracted to exclusionary forms of nationalism, then there is a danger that the nationalist movement of which they are a part may become more aggressive and more dangerous (p.17). Panarin looks for answers to his questions in sociological surveys. Ten page questionnaires with more than 190 questions were sent out to young people (primarily under 29 years old) in Russia and Kazakhstan. The author bases his conclusions on the 560 questionnaires that were returned.
Although sociological surveys may indeed provide interesting insights into the ways in which nationalism and nationalist movements operate, this particular survey suffers from numerous problems. It seems to me that the only youths with enough free time to answer such a long questionnaire would be educated and middle class. The questions asked in the survey (e.g., “What is nationalism?” and “How would you identify yourself-with nation, the whole global community, etc.?”) were very broad and vague. One conclusion reached by the author is that respondents who tended to view nationalism primarily in political (not social) terms did not fully embrace exclusionary types of nationalism. (It is not entirely clear to me whether this insight contributes much to the study of nationalism and state building.) In other conclusions, Panarin suggests that young Russians usually prefer migration or political passivity (preoccupation with their personal life) to ethnic confrontation. This was a reaction to the attempts of non-Russian elites to create new states based on ethnicity (in this case, Kazakhstan).
Non-Russian elites and their state-building strategies are also explored by Andrei Grozin in “The Republic of Kazakhstan in Search of an Official Ideology” and Ekaterina Borisova in “The Institution of the Presidency in Kazakhstan.” Instead of relying on sociological surveys, Grozin studied numerous official documents that were produced by different ministries within Kazakhstan and by non-state actors. He identifies three periods in the creation of a common ideology in Kazakhstan. In 1990-92 (“Common Kazakh Patriotism”), the political elites attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to create a sense of common identity among Kazakhstan’s different ethnic groups. Interestingly, political Islam did not become popular during this period because there were not enough clerics who could spread the religion. Political elites were not attracted to religion as a source of cohesion. Instead, during the second period of state building (starting in April 1992), the Kazakh political elites chose to draw on Kazakh traditions and the re-invention of a past to create a sense of community. President Nazarbayev declared that the state of Kazakhstan is the expression of Kazakh nationhood (p. 378). During this stage, feelings of mistrust toward “imperial Russia,” certain Islamic groups, Uzbeks, and other groups developed. Grozin appropriately quotes Mr. Tatimov, the “main demographer” of Kazakhstan (p. 379), who argues that the creation of a strong national state, capable of successful economic development, works best in an ethnically homogenous context.
During the second period, ethnocentric ideology became the leading philosophy of Kazakh political elites. The elites made this ideology (Kazakhstan as a state primarily for one ethnic group, i.e., the Kazakhs) into the leading ideology of their young state, in which ethnic Kazakhs are (numerically) a minority. According to Borisova, during the same period (the mid-nineties) President Nazarbayev managed to acquire the legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the state for himself. President Nazarbayev preached “national unity” hoping to strengthen his own power. Grozin suggests that instead of achieving national unity, Nazarbayev’s ethnocentric policies may in the end lead to ethnic divisions in this multiethnic state. They may create fears that the country is descending into “the Middle Ages” or is becoming an “Asiatic kingdom” (p. 408).
Similar themes (the role of elites in multiethnic societies attempting to build nation-states, the formation of mass belief systems and the process of identification by ethnic minorities whose identities are threatened by other groups) are addressed by Vadim Tsymburskii (“North Ossetia in the First Half of the 1990s: A Search for Statehood from Geopolitical and Socio-Functionalist Perspectives”), Vladimir Bobrovnikov (“Islamophobia and Religious Legislation in Post-Soviet Daghestan”), and Svetlana Lourie (“Ethnic Self-Identification Against the Crisis of the “Mother” Ethnos: The Armenian Community’s Experience in St. Petersburg, 1989-93). Tsymburskii’s article analyzes the discourse of political elites in North Ossetia, showing how the changing geopolitical situation has affected the evaluation of history (e.g., in October 1991, after the disintegration of the USSR, local elites started talking about the genocide that was conducted against the Ossetian nation, thus hoping to gain political currency for state building.) The article meticulously records a number of policies undertaken by the elites to enhance the status of their homeland. In the end, however, the North Ossetian project of the early nineties, which aimed at the creation of a strong ethnically based political entity, turned out to be a failure.
Vladimir Bobrovnikov’s article explores the creation of religious policies in the North Caucasus. The author argues that the federal elites in Russia fear the effects of the socioeconomic crisis that has plagued the North Caucasus since the late eighties. The actions of foreign (especially Muslim) countries trying to draw the North Caucasus into their area of influence are also of major concern to federal elites. The article includes an excellent description of regional characteristics and the political uses of Wahhabi Islam (an ultraconservative form of Islam exported to numerous countries, including the former USSR, by the Saudis, both by government-sponsored organizations and wealthy individuals). The author argues that the federal elites (who suffer from a serious phobia of Islam) do not understand Islam nor do they understand the religious feelings of the people living in the North Caucasus. This phobia prevents successful communication between Moscow and the Caucasus. Since 1994, the federal government has attempted to create top-down power hierarchies and control the religious groups that are perceived as “dangerous.” Wahhabi Islam is considered to be a major threat and the federal powers are trying to cleanse the region of its influence. According to the author, one of the main mistakes made by the federal elites is to treat different types of Islam as political extremism. Currently neither local nor federal elites have enough resources to totally eliminate the influence of the Wahhabists. Instead, the result of their current policies drives the representatives of this movement into secret opposition, which may lead to disastrous results, such as the rise in terrorism.
The articles discussed above underline the importance of elites and the strategies they choose for the future shape of states-in-the-making. The elites are the ones who create the sense that ethnic identities are permanent and have always “been there.” The success of the nationalist projects depends on the ability of the elites to create certain structures of power (such as armies, police, and other repressive institutions) to support their visions of ethnic states. The actions of the central (federal government) also affect the success of nationalist projects in the autonomous regions. As Bobronikov’s analysis suggests, the Russian federal elites may in fact have strengthened the radical Islamic movement in the North Caucasus by trying to suppress it. Theoretically, the insights put forward in this volume strengthen the constructivist perspective outlined at the beginning of this review. In addition, they provide a wealth of well researched case studies useful not only to students of post-Soviet nationalism, but also to those interested in Islamic movements, migration, and Diasporas in the former Soviet empire.