The Politburo’s 1985 election of Mikhail Gorbachev as the General-Secretary of the Soviet Union initiated a period of monumental reforms designed to reignite the economy and erase the stagnation in Soviet politics and society. His policies of perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (openness) and demokratizatsiia (democratization) made changes to the structure of Soviet government and society, welcomed free and uninhibited communication, and enacted electoral reforms. Perestroika brought the most sweeping changes to the Soviet Union, with economic, political, and social spheres being restructured. The purpose of perestroika was to simplify the post-Stalinist Soviet state and return it to what Gorbachev considered to be its original Bolshevik goals, but his policies failed to recreate Soviet life as Gorbachev intended. Instead, these changes railed against the authoritarian systems of rule and destroyed Soviet citizens’ sense of certainty and reliance upon their government. These changes also allowed for the unprecedented expression of anti-governmental views that encouraged the state’s numerous nationalities to demand autonomy and independence, facilitating the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Glasnost and perestroika allowed the titular nationalities of the Soviet republics to freely express and disseminate their ideas and goals for the conceptions of a homeland that had not previously been possible. In Georgia’s case, this discourse sped up the nation-building process among ethnic Georgians that eventually resulted in a newly independent Georgian republic. However, there were many non-titular ethnic groups, long similarly suppressed by Soviet domination that also began asserting their claims to statehood. This last result prolonged the nation-building process in Georgia, turning the nation-building process violent and casting doubt on the legitimacy of the entire undertaking.
Gorbachev’s reformist policies alone did not recreate an independent Georgian republic, but created the conditions of relative political freedom that fostered various organizations and movements that further galvanized Georgian nationalist sentiments, particularly after the 1989 Tbilisi Massacre. This event became a pivotal point in the Georgian national consciousness. Gorbachev’s reforms also influenced rejuvenated separatist efforts by both the Abkhazian and Ossetian minorities in Georgia. These nationalist sentiments also allowed for a change in the leadership of Georgia, transitioning from a Communist-dominated government to one led by an elected president, in the first case Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who came out of the Round Table/Free Georgia coalition.

GORBACHEV AND THE “TRUE SOVIET” NATIONALITY POLICY: BETWEEN THE “SOVIET MAN” AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, many scholars have tried to assess Gorbachev’s views about the country’s various nationalities. It appears that Gorbachev was not equipped to deal with such national differences. He spent over twenty years working in the Stavropol krai (district) before arriving in Moscow. The fact that 90 percent of Stavropol’s population was Russian and that Gorbachev therefore had little experience working with other nationalities was to prove significant.^[1]
Gorbachev’s own records, however, suggested otherwise. He strongly emphasized how his time in Stavropol was valuable training for understanding the Soviet Union’s complex multi-national composition. He also recounted how assisting the return of Stalin’s North Caucasian deportees affected him. It was at this dramatic moment that Gorbachev decided that Stalinist repression did not solve problems and determined never to use such tactics.^[2] Despite Gorbachev’s assertions that he was prepared to deal with nationality issues because of his work in Stavropol, it was doubtful that he encountered much diversity during his twenty years of service there.
Scholars have disagreed about Gorbachev’s competence concerning these issues. Robert Strayer and Robert Kaiser both clearly asserted that Gorbachev was ill prepared to handle the expression of nationalist sentiment and ethnic violence of the late 1980s. Kaiser determined that nationality problems as one of the two main issues, the other being economic, that led to Gorbachev’s downfall in August 1991. Also according to Kaiser, it took five years for Gorbachev to realize that national divisions actually existed within the Soviet Union. By 1990, however, nationalists throughout the country had begun to use his reforms against central government efforts to separate their homelands from Soviet authority.^[3]
Other scholars credited Gorbachev’s failures in nationality policy to the fact that he truly believed in the concept of a “Soviet citizen” and, therefore, ignored the problem. Yaroslav Bilinsky stated that Gorbachev simply refused to face the reality of the Soviet Union’s troubled ethnic landscape and the country experienced nationalist disturbances between 1988-9. When commenting on these disturbances, Gorbachev merely reaffirmed the situation’s status quo, failing to deal with the underlying problems. He simplistically concluded that “Our party advocates a large and strong federal state, being convinced that this is in the interests of all peoples who have joined in the Soviet Union.”^[4] Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky also agreed that Gorbachev, and many top leaders in his administration, never expected nationality issues to threaten the Soviet Union, mistakenly believing that the system had solved the nationality problem.^[5]
Some of these same scholars also alluded to Gorbachev’s cultural insensitivity and sometimes called him an outright Russian nationalist. According to John Dunlop, Gorbachev’s “Soviet Man” was synonymous with a Russian man. In addition, he consistently interchanged “Russian” for “Soviet” during his tenure as General-Secretary. Bilinksy also called Gorbachev pro-Russian because of the leader’s frequent appointments of Russian nationalists to his government and public praise of Russian literary legends, namely Dostoevsky (also a Russian nationalist).^[6]
Perhaps the most famous example of his cultural mishaps occurred in Kazakhstan during the anti-corruption measures of 1986. Gorbachev replaced the longtime First-Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, whose two decades in power were full of patronage and corruption. It was expected, according to past Soviet policy, that an ethnic Kazakh would replace Kunaev. Instead, Gorbachev named Gennadi Kolbin, a Chuvash whom the Kazakhs considered to be a Russian, to replace Kunaev. The Kazakhs rioted in Almaty. In spite of the immediate and alarming violence, Gorbachev only replaced the Russian with an ethnic Kazkh, Nursultan Nazarbaev, three years later. Despite admitting that he ignored cultural sensitivities when appointing Kolbin, he still expressed shock at the level of protest in Almaty.^[7] Not only did the Kazakhs resent the fact that governmental decisions were made on behalf of their republic in Moscow, they also protested increased Russian domination in their political lives.
Gorbachev’s own words, of course, portrayed him in a different light. He clearly believed in the notion of a unified Soviet citizenry. He also considered the national question solved because of the level of unity achieved within the country. He thought this unity was impossible to accomplish without the cooperation of all and every of its more than one hundred nationalities. In 1988, he said that

“If the nationality question had not been solved in principle, the Soviet Union would never have had the social, cultural, economic, and defense potential it has now. Our state would not have survived if the republics had not formed a community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance.”^[8]
Despite scholarly condemnation of Gorbachev’s understanding of nationality issues, his writings on the topic revealed contradictions in his attitude. He believed, at least in theory, that every national culture was a treasure that the Soviet Union must protect. He spoke out against too much federal interference in the republics, which he thought contributed to ethnic tensions. At the same time, he warned nationalist groups against the separatism that inflamed differences and threatened the Soviet Union’s security. ^[9]
Gorbachev’s actions also showed that he at least paid minimal attention to the Soviet Union’s national tensions. One of the earliest resolutions on the national question came during the 19th All-Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1988. The resolution “On Relations Between Soviet Nationalities” recognized the need to loosen central control of the republics and autonomous areas in order to ensure a cooperative national diversity rather than a forced unification. It also called for expanded opportunities for ethnic groups to fulfill national and cultural needs in communication, education, art, etc.^[10]

GEORGIAN RESPONSES TO GORBACHEV’S REFORMS

Gorbachev’s changes helped Georgia increase the legacy of political activism. The radical changes to the rigid structure of the Soviet government left many channels open for change. Consequently, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR) experienced other types of protests during Gorbachev’s tenure. Many important events and groups emerged during this time, including environmental associations, organizations formed in honor of great Georgian historical figures, such as Ilia Chavchavadze, and, not surprisingly, movements in support of the Georgian language.
Green movements flourished during the late 1980s and were particularly strong in Georgia. Perestroika, glasnost, and the Chernobyl catastrophe forced the Communist Party to face the environmental damage and legacy its policies created and subsequently ignored. Gorbachev’s Soviet Union could not ignore environmental degradation because it became nationalized. Environmental protesters leveled charges against the central government concerning the reallocation of funds for environmental projects, the use of imported Russian labor over resident nationals in the republics, and ethnic discrimination in environmental issues.^[11]
The protest over the Caucasian Mountain Railway (KPZhD) in August 1988 was a good example of both the changes Gorbachev’s reforms made in the political discourse of the republics and the strength of such environmental causes (or the futility of the central government’s environmental policy). The KPZhD was originally a nineteenth century proposal that the Bolsheviks had reinvigorated three times by 1947. The plans lay dormant until 1984 when Moscow included it as part of the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan. The railway was to extend over 300 miles, included eleven tunnels, and eighty-five bridges.^[12]
Despite the fact that the railway would reduce the distance to the North Caucasus by at least 1600 miles, reducing travel time by eight hours, employ thousands of workers, and further develop the republic’s economy, many Georgian writers, academics, and scientists rallied against the government’s efforts. These protests were similar to the dissent emerging from environmental problems in other republics as well. Besides the commonplace concerns that construction would damage indigenous flora and fauna, protesters cited archeological sites and at least one hundred historical monuments stood in railway’s path. They also argued that imported Russian workers would overwhelm isolated mountain communities and, most importantly, central planners failed to consult with Georgian experts and leaders before planning construction.^[13] Concerns about destruction of archeological and historical monuments, and more undue control from Moscow attracted Georgian nationalists to this debate.
In May 1988, Dzhumber Patiashvili,^[14] the First-Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia (CPG), showed a un-reformist attitude when he unilaterally declared anyone against the KPZhD to be an enemy of the people and refused to allow any open dialogue about the project. The protesters persisted though and sent a petition with approximately 800 signatures to Moscow complaining about the Georgian leadership’s unwillingness to debate the issue. The Georgian-language newspaper Komunisti (Communist) reported on August 29, 1988 that the government was delaying the project for one year. The protesters considered this a victory, even though the central government still expressed a commitment to the railway.^[15]
The KPZhD protest, however, was small and relatively unimportant to the majority of Georgians. Intellectuals dominated the debate and the supposed risks were too obscure to motivate the general populace. This protest was similar to Gamsakhurdia’s campaigns in the 1970s to preserve Georgian cultural sites. The argument, nevertheless, demonstrated to many Georgians that there were new ways to conduct politics that the party leadership, especially the local leadership, had to acknowledge and accommodate.
The CPG lost credibility with the populace after failing to resolve the railway problem and other demonstrations concerning proposed changes to the federal constitution. In an effort to regain its standing with the Georgian people, the party enacted the State Program for the Georgian Language on November 3, 1988. This policy called for the Georgianization of all state and cultural institutions. It allowed for a greater use and expression of Georgian historical symbols, such as the flag.^[16] These moves by the CPG were so extraordinary that some Georgian Soviet dissidents, such as Eduard Gudava, found it hard to hide his disbelief (and joy) that the CPG was able to implement these changes. Referring to the growth of the Georgian liberation movement in 1989, he said, “It developed and blossomed organizationally, captured the spirit of the people and, most significantly, began to dominate with its ideological strength to which even Georgia’s Communist authorities and their agitprop were subordinated.”^[17]
More importantly, these changes expanded on the growing trend of reexamining Georgian history. The local party actually printed two articles defending the reinterpretation of the republic’s history that addressed such politically sensitive issues as the 1921 Bolshevik invasion, the purges of the 1930s, and Georgian responsibility in the purges.^[18] Georgian historians contributed significantly to this movement. Akaki Surguladze charged that the 1921 Bolshevik invasion occurred because of the machinations of Stalin and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, not because of internal revolt as the official government record stated. Ushangi Sidamonidze built on Surguladze’s statements on the seventieth anniversary of the birth of the First Georgian Republic. He publicly asserted that many governments relegated key events in history, such as the dubious legitimacy of the Bolshevik invasion, to oblivion to political order. Sidamonidze declared that glasnost allowed Georgians to commemorate the May 26th holiday, the anniversary of the First Republic, as the rebirth of Georgian independence.^[19] Unlike what was occurring in the Baltics, no one in Georgia was publicly prepared to call the Soviet annexation illegal. However, historical reassessment meant that academics were more comfortable publicly discussing things unfavorable to the Soviet government.
Just as important was the emergence and public existence of many Georgian nationalist groups. The Center for Democracy in the USSR listed 23 different nationalist movements in Georgia at the beginning of 1990.^[20] While this fact was not unusual for the Soviet republics at the time, what was significant in Georgia’s case was that many of these groups reconnected with Georgia’s past as part of efforts to build its future. The most prolific group was the Ilia Chavchavadze Society, founded in October 1987. Described as a moderately centrist organization that initially focused on language, religion, and the fatherland, it suffered a bitter split in March 1988. Gamsakhurdia and Kostova founded a splinter group, the Society of St. Ilia the Righteous, also named after Chavchavadze. Other groups of this nature included the David Agmashenebeli (the Builder) Party^[21], with the motto “happiness for everybody,” and another called I.V. Stalin, which employed the motto “respect for the old, building the new.” The use of such potent historical symbols, according to Suny, reinforced and inflamed ethnic divisions in the republic because they reminded Georgians of better times when their great kingdom was independent. However, these symbols also disturbed Georgia’s minorities and reminded them of how they were still politically subservient to Georgia.^[22]

CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM – THE TBILISI MASSACRE AND GAMSAKHURDIA IN POWER

The changing political environment in Georgia further highlighted two significant events that occurred late in the Gorbachev era that profoundly impacted its relations with the Soviet Union and the minority populations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Tbilisi Massacre and Gamsakhurdia’s rise to power both occurred because of ethnic tensions. Both events would inflame ethnic relations to the point of war, providing Russia with an avenue to remain involved in Georgia’s sovereign affairs after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.
Georgian ability to conduct political protests relatively unimpeded would end in April 1989. Abkhazians feared the renewed Georgian patriotism that Moscow was no longer interested in suppressing and attempted to exploit the relaxed political structure for their own gain. In June 1988, during the 19th All-Party Conference of the CPSU, Abkhazians demanded the right to secede from Georgia and be absorbed into the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (RFSSR). Georgians responded with protests. Abkhazian leaders further fueled Georgian anger by declaring the autonomous region’s independence and equality with the Georgian state. Georgians again took to the streets in an effort to protect the territorial integrity of the republic.^[23] They would not accept Abkhazians, who comprised less than one-fifth of Abkhazia’s population in 1989, making demands for an area that Georgians considered an integral part of their state.
On April 1, 1989, Abkhazians attacked a bus, which shuttled Chavchavadze Society members from Tbilisi to demonstrations in Abkhazia, causing an increase in the size and popularity of the Georgian protest. Within three days, the society mobilized more than 100,000 Georgians to demonstrate against Abkhaz separatism, paralyzing municipal services. Héléne Carrére d’Encausse and Jonathan Aves noted that Georgian political demands shifted from autonomy to complete independence at this time.^[24]
The government’s actions during this protest (April 1-9) were, of course, difficult to authenticate. By April 8, the number of protesters in Tbilisi had dwindled considerably, but large demonstrations in Kutais and Sukhumi frightened the local administration. Patiashvili tried to mediate with the protesters, but failed to connect with popular sentiment as Shevardnadze had been able to do in 1978.^[25] Fearing more instability, the government decided to repress the rally in Tbilisi. At approximately four in the morning on April 9, government forces (mostly Soviet military forces with some support from Georgian police) tried to move the protesters off the city square. Using sharpened trench shovels, government forces attacked the protesters, many of whom were praying. Most sources claim that 16 to 20 people were killed and almost 300 wounded. Furthermore, government forces gassed the protesters, poisoning thousands.^[26]
The backlash against the Soviet government was immense. Gorbachev and his entourage, including Shevardnadze, returned from an official visit to London the day before the killings. Aides immediately informed him of events in Tbilisi. Shevardnadze and another aide were to leave the next day to negotiate with the protesters, but Patiashvili informed them in the evening that the situation was under control and Moscow’s intervention was no longer needed. Gorbachev vigorously maintained that the army was sent to Georgia without his knowledge and speculated that the local government in Georgia fell victim to Moscow’s political intrigues.^[27]
In the light of the resulting deaths, the perpetrators of the massacre created a political nightmare for Gorbachev. The Georgian Supreme Soviet commissioned Georgian professor Tamaz Shavgulidze to conduct an independent inquiry into the incident. The subsequent report described the government’s actions not as the dispersal of a meeting, but as an unlawful and criminal decision to bring an end to the protests. The event resulted in changes in Moscow as well. Gorbachev declared that the military would be forbidden from participating further in local matters without direct approval from the General-Secretary. He stayed true to his word, only sending the military into Azerbaijan on the pretext of protecting Armenians during one of the numerous violent episodes in Nagorno-Karabakh.^[28]
Regardless of who was to blame for the purported Tbilisi Massacre, government dissenters used the tragedy and seventy years of simmering nationalism to galvanize more of the population against the central government. In an ancient land of warriors and blood feuds, Georgian nationalists categorized the memory of Tbilisi as a vital one for the national consciousness, just as important as the Treaty of Georgivesk, the 1801 Russian annexation, and certainly the 1921 Bolshevik invasion.^[29]
Gorbachev’s reforms and their consequences had one final outcome for Georgia’s impending independence, the loosening of local political controls that helped bring Gamsakhurdia to power. The Tbilisi Massacre finally ensured that Georgians lost all faith in the local communist party. Feeling betrayed by the central government and in fear of losing its power, the party did an about face after April 1989, allying itself with the Georgian nationalists. The Georgian Supreme Soviet issued a report in October 1989 censuring the central government’s actions in April. They also asserted Georgia’s right to internally handle its ethnic instability and to veto any all-Union laws that did not benefit Georgia. Givi Gumbaridze, Patiashvili’s replacement as CPG First-Secretary after the Tbilisi incident, affirmed that the CPG’s main goal was the restoration of the country’s independence. The Georgian Supreme Soviet declared in November 1989 its intent to secede from the Soviet Union by 1990 and declared that Georgia was illegally annexed by Bolshevik military intervention and occupation in 1921.^[30] This episode reflected similar events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1989 when local leaders declared the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries illegal and invalid.
These actions by the Supreme Soviet coincided with the first elections since the central government installed Gorbachev’s substantial electoral reforms under demokratizatsiia. These changes were another attempt to awaken political discourse and obtain a younger, more democratically minded cadre for the Soviet apparatus.^[31]
The Georgians took this election opportunity seriously and responded with widespread political mobilization. Gamsakhurdia’s Free Georgia Round Table coalition won over 50 percent of the parliamentary vote in the October 1990 elections and resulted in his election as chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet. The Communist Party, which won nearly 30 percent of the vote, voluntarily entered into a coalition with the Round Table members.^[32]
Gamsakhurdia’s tenure as head of Georgia’s Supreme Soviet led to the April 1991 referendum that restored Georgia’s independence based on the independence declaration from May 26, 1918. Riding on most Georgians’ hopes for freedom and prosperity, Gamsakhurdia was elected president of the republic the following May.^[33] Once he was securely in power, the true nature of Gamsakhurdia’s political objectives became clear. His quick proclamation of “Georgia for the Georgians” helped secure that ethnic support. Georgian nationalists supported him because he fought to restore Georgian independence. The country’s non-Georgian minorities, however, feared losing their power.^[34]
Gamsakhurdia’s rise to power in part proves that Gorbachev’s reforms had just as much an effect on local government as well as it did on the Soviet federal government. The greater expression of divergent views without fear of government backlash and the restructuring of the political system that made room for more than just communist candidates were the main two reforms that most influenced the future Republic of Georgia. Glasnost not only enhanced opportunities for the traditional Soviet elites to express themselves, but also expanded the opportunity for participation by non-elites in the process as well.^[35]
Georgians saw a way to reclaim their statehood, stolen in the the early twentieth century, for the first time in seven decades. The victims of the Tbilisi Massacre clearly demonstrated that Georgian protests drew on a wide spectrum of the population, including students and women. On the other hand, non-titular minorities such as the Ossetians and Abkhazians believed that they had to fight against Georgian efforts to assimilate them, which they regarded as attempted ethnic cleansing. With little legal recourse as ethnically defined autonomous areas, these groups appealed directly to Moscow for assistance. The uncertainty surrounding the last years of the Soviet Union severely polarized these diverging perceptions. These various groups turned debates about the new world order and turned them into battles for the very existence of their respective nations’ ancient and glorious pasts. Claiming the right to preserve their nations became a battle to determine the rightful and historical owner of the disputed territories. The upcoming instability in this former Soviet republic revealed future foreign policy dilemmas for the fledgling Russian Federation. How the Russians decided to confront these problems clearly affected the outcome of these crises.
Gorbachev’s perestroika policies had both negative and positive ramifications in many areas. The policy’s relaxation of many repressive Soviet regulations helped shape ethnic relations within the Republic of Georgia. On the one hand, it did help provide groups as well as individuals with long-missing rights, such as the freedoms of speech, religion, and expression (even if not absolute). These same freedoms, however, failed to address problems that the lack of these freedoms caused over the Soviet Union’s existence. Consequently, there was no model according to which these ethnic groups could cooperate without the mediation and/or interference of the central government in Moscow.