2/2002 Organization of Political Space of Empires and Nations

Националистическая мобилизация и коллапс империи: сербский и русский национализм в сравнении, 1987-1991 гг.

Нейл Абрамс

2/2002

Статья публикуется на английском.

SUMMARY:

Статья Нейла Абрамса посвящена сравнению распада двух многонациональных государств, Югославии и Советского Союза. Автор анализирует эти процессы сквозь призму национальной мобилизации доминантных народов – сербов и русских. Несмотря на сходство определенных ситуативных черт (например, наследие коммунистической идеологии), степень, в которой национальная мобилизация захватила умы и сердца людей, была различной и привела к различным последствиям. Абрамс обращается к классическим работам по теории национализма и находит их недостаточными для решения поставленной в статье задачи.
Учитывая разнообразные факторы, такие, например, как наличие “своей” традиции мощного имперского государства, историческая актуальность страха, связанного с национальным выживанием и проч., Абрамс исследует протекание процесса социальной мобилизации и становления на его волне национального государства в России и Сербии. По мнению Абрамса, именно различия государственного статуса народа в период социальной мобилизации прежде всего ответственны за различия в националистических дискурсах России и Сербии. Если сербы традиционно ощущали угрозу своему национальному существованию, то русские в течение всей истории Нового Времени являлись империеобразующим народом. В силу этого дискурс жертвы, столь выраженный в Сербии, не имел большого влияния среди русских в СССР. По мнению автора, предложенный им метод анализа механизма и направленности национальной мобилизации позволяет в каждом конкретном случае спрогнозировать не только когда и как, но и против кого конкретно она произойдет.
Статья содержит собственный обширный терминологический аппарат.

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1.This is not to ignore significant differences between Serbs and Russians and the states in which they lived. To begin with, Serbs succeeded in gaining an independent state only in the late nineteenth century. However, by the time most Russians came to think of themselves in national terms, they could refer to a Russian state that had existed for hundreds of years. In addition, both the Tsarist and Soviet states were great powers while states under which Serbs historically lived occupied far more marginal positions in the international system. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Yugoslav state took the form of a gradual and prolonged process. This process arguably began in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the nationalist agitation of Albanians, Croats, and Slovenes for greater rights and the subsequent adoption of a confederal constitution that substantially decentralized power towards the republics. This contrasts with the experience of the Soviet Union, which retained a highly centralized structure until the Gorbachev era when the party-state collapsed with stunning speed. Nevertheless, the similarities in the conditions facing Serbs and Russians were substantial enough to warrant an investigation into the question of why the former mobilized behind an extreme nationalist ideology while the latter did not.↩

2.To say that Milosevic promoted or espoused an extreme nationalist ideology is not to say that he necessarily believed in it. Milosevic built his political career as a communist, not a nationalist. In my view, he was interested above all in enhancing his own personal power, not in fulfilling the nationalist aspirations of the Serbian people. Yet he recognized the value of using an extreme nationalist ideology to pursue his personal ambitions and, by promoting this ideology, he became the dominant leader of the Serbs. Nevertheless, whether or not Milosevic believed in the ideology he promoted is not so relevant for the purposes of the current analysis. For I am not asking why Milosevic espoused such an ideology but rather why Serbs mobilized in support of this ideology. Therefore, the relative weight of nationalist belief, communist ideology, or sheer personal greed in driving Milosevic’s actions is of little consequence for the task of answering the main question of this article.

Примечания

[1]This is not to ignore significant differences between Serbs and Russians and the states in which they lived. To begin with, Serbs succeeded in gaining an independent state only in the late nineteenth century. However, by the time most Russians came to think of themselves in national terms, they could refer to a Russian state that had existed for hundreds of years. In addition, both the Tsarist and Soviet states were great powers while states under which Serbs historically lived occupied far more marginal positions in the international system. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Yugoslav state took the form of a gradual and prolonged process. This process arguably began in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the nationalist agitation of Albanians, Croats, and Slovenes for greater rights and the subsequent adoption of a confederal constitution that substantially decentralized power towards the republics. This contrasts with the experience of the Soviet Union, which retained a highly centralized structure until the Gorbachev era when the party-state collapsed with stunning speed. Nevertheless, the similarities in the conditions facing Serbs and Russians were substantial enough to warrant an investigation into the question of why the former mobilized behind an extreme nationalist ideology while the latter did not.

[2]To say that Milosevic promoted or espoused an extreme nationalist ideology is not to say that he necessarily believed in it. Milosevic built his political career as a communist, not a nationalist. In my view, he was interested above all in enhancing his own personal power, not in fulfilling the nationalist aspirations of the Serbian people. Yet he recognized the value of using an extreme nationalist ideology to pursue his personal ambitions and, by promoting this ideology, he became the dominant leader of the Serbs. Nevertheless, whether or not Milosevic believed in the ideology he promoted is not so relevant for the purposes of the current analysis. For I am not asking why Milosevic espoused such an ideology but rather why Serbs mobilized in support of this ideology. Therefore, the relative weight of nationalist belief, communist ideology, or sheer personal greed in driving Milosevic’s actions is of little consequence for the task of answering the main question of this article.

[3]However, there were divisions among Serbian nationalist leaders regarding the future status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under a new political arrangement. Milosevic supported increasing the dominance of Serbs within the framework of a preserved Yugoslav state. Other nationalists, such as Vuk Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj, called for abandoning Yugoslavia altogether in favor of an expanded “Greater Serbia” that would include all Serbs within its borders. Despite these differences, every Serbian nationalist leader during this period shared the position that all Serbs must be incorporated into a single state in which they would occupy a clearly dominant role. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out these divisions between various Serbian nationalists.

Ab Imperio

Ab Imperio

Националистическая мобилизация и коллапс империи: сербский и русский национализм в сравнении, 1987-1991 гг.

Примечания