Интерпретация, намерение и закон: аргумент против теории “первоначального замысла”

Теренс Болл

3/2007

Материал публикуется на английском (на английской части сайта)

SUMMARY:

Статья посвящена сложной проблеме интерпретации правовых вопросов, в частности – конституционных. Конституция Соединенных Штатов Америки и ее противоречивые прочтения юристами и обычными гражданами служат автору материалом для размышлений над более общими вопросами интерпретации исторических документов с правовой точки зрения. Автор подробно рассматривает одну из интерпретационных стратегий – “оригинализм”, или “оригинальное намерение”, и демонстрирует заложенные в ней опасности. В качестве основной опасности он выделяет восприятие некогда убедительных, но ныне пересмотренных теорий и концептов в тех категориях, в которых рассуждали о политическом американские Отцы-Основатели. С точки зрения автора статьи, это ретроградная и рационально ничем не оправдываемая тенденция.

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1.See Quentin Skinner’s methodological manifesto, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) and his other essays in: Meaning in Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Princeton, 1989, as well as Quentin Skinner. Visions of Politics. Cambridge, 2002, 3 vols. The work of others – Peter Laslett, John Dunn, J.G.A. Pocock, Richard Tuck, Mark Goldie, James Tully, Richard Ashcraft, et al. – is also noteworthy.↩

2.For a useful taxonomy of types of originalism, see Paul Brest. The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding // Boston University Law Review. 1980. Vol. 60. Pp. 204-238.↩

3.See my Deadly Hermeneutics; or, Sinn and the Social Scientist // Terence Ball (Ed.). Idioms of Inquiry. Albany, 1987. Pp. 95 112. Think, for example, of the impact on African-Americans of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision declaring that slaves were property and nothing more; or of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision declaring that “separate but equal” treatment and accommodation were legally acceptable; or of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that struck down Plessy, at least as regards education.↩

4.See Jack N. Rakove (Ed.). Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent. Boston, 1990.↩

5.For the philosophical and methodological justification for narrating “conceptual histories,” see Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past. Cambridge, MA, 1985. For concrete conceptual histories, see Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.). Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Stuttgart, 1972-2004, 8 vols.; and Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt (Eds.). Handbuch politisch sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680 1820. Munich, 1985 et sec., 20 vols. to date. For more anglicized and americanized versions of conceptual history, see Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Eds.). Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge, 1989; Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Eds.). Conceptual Change and the Constitution. Lawrence, 1988; and Terence Ball. Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History. Oxford, 1988.↩

6.Isaiah Berlin. Concepts and Categories. Harmondsworth, 1981. P. 154.↩

7.See, e.g., Clifford Geertz. From the Native’s Point of View // Idem. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York, 1983; and Quentin Skinner. Seeing Things Their Way // Idem. Visions of Politics. Vol. I. Regarding Method.↩

8.Garry Wills. Explaining America: The Federalist. New York, 1981. P. 280.↩

9.Terence Ball. Transforming Political Discourse. Oxford, 1988.↩

10.See Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. New York, 1975.↩

11.Vide J. G. A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton, 1975.↩

12.See Ball. Transforming Political Discourse. Pp. 48-54.↩

13.Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue. Notre Dame, 1981.↩

14.Daniel Walker Howe. The Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers // Ball and Pocock (Eds.). Conceptual Change. Ch. 7.↩

15.The following tale is told more fully by Donald Kelley. Civil Science in the Renaissance: The Problem of Interpretation // Anthony Pagden (Ed.). The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe. Cambridge, 1990.↩

16.Cf. Max Farrand (Ed.). The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. New Haven, 1966 and Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner (Eds.). The Founders’ Constitution. Chicago, 1987.↩

17.Though not alone among the Founders, Alexander Hamilton came to believe the Constitution a failure. “Perhaps no man in the United States,” he wrote in 1802, “has sacrificed or done more for the present Constitution than myself; and contrary to all my anticipations of its fate… I am still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric.” Quoted in John C. Miller. Alexander Hamilton. New York, 1959. P. 543.↩

18.For different variants of reception theory, see Stanley Fish. Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, MA, 1980; Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Eds.). The Reader in the Text. Princeton, 1980; Hans Robert Jauss. Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. Minneapolis, 1982; and, for a general overview, Robert C. Holub. Reception Theory. London, 1984.↩

19.This and all following quotations come from: The Federalist. 1788. No. 37 [James Madison] // Terence Ball (Ed.). The Federalist. Cambridge, 2003. Pp. 168-174.↩

20.Madison’s source here is apparently John Locke. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Book III, chapters 9 and 10.↩

Примечания

[1]See Quentin Skinner’s methodological manifesto, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) and his other essays in: Meaning in Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Princeton, 1989, as well as Quentin Skinner. Visions of Politics. Cambridge, 2002, 3 vols. The work of others – Peter Laslett, John Dunn, J.G.A. Pocock, Richard Tuck, Mark Goldie, James Tully, Richard Ashcraft, et al. – is also noteworthy.

[2]For a useful taxonomy of types of originalism, see Paul Brest. The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding // Boston University Law Review. 1980. Vol. 60. Pp. 204-238.

[3]See my Deadly Hermeneutics; or, Sinn and the Social Scientist // Terence Ball (Ed.). Idioms of Inquiry. Albany, 1987. Pp. 95 112. Think, for example, of the impact on African-Americans of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision declaring that slaves were property and nothing more; or of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision declaring that “separate but equal” treatment and accommodation were legally acceptable; or of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that struck down Plessy, at least as regards education.

[4]See Jack N. Rakove (Ed.). Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent. Boston, 1990.

[5]For the philosophical and methodological justification for narrating “conceptual histories,” see Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past. Cambridge, MA, 1985. For concrete conceptual histories, see Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.). Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Stuttgart, 1972-2004, 8 vols.; and Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt (Eds.). Handbuch politisch sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680 1820. Munich, 1985 et sec., 20 vols. to date. For more anglicized and americanized versions of conceptual history, see Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Eds.). Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge, 1989; Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Eds.). Conceptual Change and the Constitution. Lawrence, 1988; and Terence Ball. Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History. Oxford, 1988.

Ab Imperio

Ab Imperio

Интерпретация, намерение и закон: аргумент против теории “первоначального замысла”

Примечания