When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, many commentators speculated about the consequences for the diasporic Russian population living throughout the southern tier, most particularly in Central Asia. Chiefly, the focus seemed to be on the so-called “brain-drain” that would be created when Russians and other intellectuals left the region in droves, causing social and economic hardships throughout the already impoverished Central Asian republics. Little if any attention was given to the consequences for Russia. Could it absorb this population? Could the new immigrants find work, housing, or adjust to an environment that was discernibly different? Many commentators feared, perhaps justifiably, that Moscow might be easily seduced by the temptation to interfere in the internal affairs of the Central Asian republics. The concern was that Moscow would find it extraordinarily difficult to ignore this significant population living as minorities in the newly established, independent Muslim states. Would Russians be mistreated? Would their rights be violated? Many outside observers feared that Russia might eventually use this population as a pawn to reassert its hegemony over the region; that this new geopolitical environment was simply a pretext that could lead to instability in a region that lacked political legitimacy, social cohesion, and economic capacities. Russia’s concerns about its brethren, however, was soon mitigated by another pressing issue – namely, the exodus that might occur back to Russia by those seeking refuge from living in a region that seemed eager to reject its Russian-Soviet past, a situation that the motherland was unprepared to face and reluctant to embrace.
Natalia Kosmarskaia’s work, The Children of Empire, examines the fate of Russians, and Russian “speakers,” that fled Central Asia only to return to Kirgizstan or to the point of their initial departure. The author, an ethno-sociologist with the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences, traveled throughout the region interviewing “people from the street” in order to understand the socio-economic reasons behind not only the reasons to leave Kirgizstan but, and perhaps more importantly, the decisions to return. The author stresses that her approach to this work was to emphasize Western “qualitative sociology” techniques, utilizing independent sources such as interviews with migrants, politicians, journalists, and scholars. Moreover, Kosmarskaia acknowledges that Western scholars have addressed the issue of the Russian diaspora in a manner that was fundamentally different from how former Soviet scholars have approached similar studies. She criticizes the “alarmist” conclusions that have permeated much writing in Russia during the decade and a half since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kosmarskaia describes these phenomenona as having been essentially ignored by scholars. Her innovative approach is unique; the book’s character grounded in its thematic substance and its empirical foundation.
“Alarmist” themes have often been noted in both print and electronic media, fueled by the rise of the internet. In the West, scholars and commentators were not immune to the “alarmist” trend, although it lacked the nationalist tendency too often evident in Russia. Two works of particular note in the 1990s attempted to analyze the role of Russia and Russians living in the newly defined “near abroad.” The first, The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (edited V. Shlapentokh, M. Sendich, and E. Payin) appeared in 1994; and the second, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics by P. Kolstш was published one year later.^[1] Each concluded that Russians living in the former Soviet territory could potentially be a disruptive force in the social, political, and economic evolution of the non-Russian republics. The concern, too, was that Russia might use these disparate populations to reassert its influence. Much of Kosmarskaia’s research used materials collected in the mid 1990s, and conceivably could have reached similar conclusions. But Kosmarskaia was not concerned solely with that issue; she instead sought to understand what pushed or pulled Russians and Russian speakers back to Kirgizstan.
What observers have failed, to this point, to understand is why a significant percentage of Russians have either stayed where they currently live, or why they returned “home” after migrating to Russia. She notes that most Russian commentators initially defined the problem as economic in nature – that the living conditions in the territory of origin had deteriorated enough to compel an individual or family to uproot and move to a place that was considered more stable or prosperous. There were push-pull forces at work in the decision made by many migrants. The economic assumption evokes images of earlier migration patterns from Russia to Central Asia a century before. George Demko, in his work Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan,^[2] described this process as the “push” factor. Prospects to settle on unlimited land push Russian migrants to make the arduous journey. Ethnic-national identity was a “pull” factor in the post-Soviet era. What this meant was that Russians would feel more at “home” in an environment where their physical and linguistic traits more closely matched that of their neighbors. It assumed a degree of social but not necessarily economic comfort.
Kosmarskaia asks rather simple questions, but complex in the depth and breadth of responses that could be discerned. Who are the immigrants? What was their condition before and after 1991? Have they developed coping mechanisms? Have they noticed discrimination? Have they detected increased or decreased social mobility patterns? Do they have stronger civil or national identities? Are there legitimate political opportunities? Each of these questions can, and does, illicit myriad responses. In order to balance the respondents’ answers, the author also compares them with Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic republics, where it has been noted by many observers that the post-Soviet environment has been much more restrictive and hostile to this community. This comparison does not work as well because the economic difference between the Baltic states and Central Asian republics is relatively significant, and geographic proximity to European Russia is duly noted. A more interesting comparison might have been made with the Caucasus republics; however, even this would have had its limitations. Moreover, it can be argued that the sense of “empire” was more strongly felt in Central Asia among the Russians than anywhere else, though this does seem to be evident in part 2 of the book when the author discusses popular interpretations by both Kirgiz and Russians concerning the historical and imperial role of Russia in Central Asia.
The work is divided into four sections, each of which attempts to define and characterize who comprises the diasporas, the reasons for returning to Russia, and the reasons for returning to the point of origin. Section 1 analyzes the concept of migration of Russian speakers, including social and economic reasons for departure and return. Section 2 delves deeper into these issues and examines the role of markets and economic dislocation and discrimination. Section 3, the most interesting for this reviewer, examines the “metamorphosis of identity” from Soviet, to Russian, to “Russian Kyrgyzstani.” Section 4, “The Future Trajectory: If not a Diaspora, Than What?” examines the future prospects for Russian speakers in Kyrgyzstan.
Kosmarskaia addresses what she refers to as the different socio-cultural markers of identity – that Russian speakers recognize they are different despite having lived among Kyrgyz for generations in some cases. Russian speakers clearly differentiate between “us” and “them,” but as long as they are not subjected to overt discrimination, they believe they have a vested interest in the country’s development. Russian speakers are engaged in a cultural and linguistic dichotomy, namely between an ethnic identity (Russian) and a regional identity that situates them in Central Asia. The reconciliation of these two different perspectives is still evolving.
The author also undertakes an examination of “grass-roots” organizations and networks that provide a degree of comfort for Russian speakers, a sense of belonging that might otherwise be absent in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Nonetheless, there has not been, as some anticipated, “compatriot” support groups that have mobilized opposition to Russification policies of the past, and that have created severe and hostile environments for living in Central Asia today. She argues that the relatively weak control of the government in Bishkek over social life in the republic has enabled Russian speakers to continue to live there; however, she also notes that their struggle to preserve the Russian cultural milieu will diminish over time as the titular nationality asserts its cultural hegemony. The Russian speakers are creating enclaves that she calls an “autochthonous project.” Perhaps one conclusion we can draw form this work is that territory provides a stronger sense of comfort than might normally be supposed. Ethnic and national identity are powerful forces to be sure, but where one is born, where one’s kin might be buried, have proven to be significantly attractive forces and clearly at play in decisions being made to stay or return to a place one calls “home.”
This work is well documented and utilizes rigorous quantitative resources and methodology. For anyone interested in understanding the nature of the Russian diaspora and the failure of the “brain-drain” from Central Asia that so many predicted following the Soviet collapse, this study provides a valuable contribution.