The scholarly analysis of post-communist Russia during the 1990s has been characterized by intellectual battles between “particularists” and “universalists” that produced clashing avalanches of literature ranging from multidisciplinary area studies-style accounts of post-Soviet transformation to theory-based “transitological” works that viewed Russia from a comparative perspective as a case study of the transition to democracy and capitalism.^[1] A decade later, these deliberations largely resulted in the triumph of the comparative approach. In bitter criticism of area studies and the miscalculations of Sovietology, the majority of prominent scholars, most notably, political scientists, moved away from historical, cultural, and social explanations and into the world of abstract theories.^[2]
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss is a well-recognized figure of the “transition to democracy” – comparative and universalistic – paradigmatic landscape. Currently at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, Stoner-Weiss previously taught at Princeton, Columbia and McGill Universities, and held fellowships at Harvard University (where she received her Ph.D. in Government) and the Kennan Institute. Among her numerous publications is an important volume After the Collapse of Communism (2004),^[3] which Stoner-Weiss co-edited with the maharishi of democratization discourse, Michael McFaul.
Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia, Stoner-Weiss’ second single-authored volume, is a “transitological” work that addresses Russian regionalism.^[4] The Russian case, argues the author, provides a wealth of lessons learned that reiterate how imperative politico-economic institution-building is for good governance (P. 155). Since state power is contingent upon the state’s ability to govern successfully across its territory, Stoner-Weiss points out the necessity to evaluate “not just the kind of government in any particular state (democratic or authoritarian)… but the degree of government and the state’s actual capacity to govern” (P. 12).^[5] The Soviet state was hyper-centralized and governed effectively, contends the author. In contrast, the author notes that post-1991 Russia has endured “rapid decentralization” (Pp. 45, 96), and suffers from a “weak state syndrome” that exemplifies a broader pattern of ineffective governance in young and still-imperfect democracies (P. 12). With skepticism consistent with the discipline of political science, Stoner-Weiss disregards ethnicity, culture, and nationalism as plausible causes of the center-periphery conflict that plagues post-Soviet Russia.^[6] She focuses instead on politico-economic factors, more specifically, on the “business-government nexus” (Pp. 98, 155), and argues that regional authorities’ resistance to the state is primarily motivated not by ethnic separatist sentiments, but by a selfish economic drive to retain control over privatized state resources.
In contemplating the politico-economic causes of “rapid decentralization,” Stoner-Weiss eschews the view of certain scholars who blame state collapse on Yeltsin’s neo-liberal reforms and disregard of Russia’s political culture.^[7] Instead, the author contends that, since “market bolshevism” was not a consistent practice but an array of half-measures “never fully implemented,” those who hold Egor Gaidar, the IMF, and the World Bank (the perpetrators of “shock therapy”) responsible are “undoubtedly looking in the wrong place for a smoking gun” (P. 21). Scapegoating, according to Stoner-Weiss, does not provide explanations for the Boris Yeltsin regime’s inability to exercise authority across the eighty-nine regions of the Russian Federation.
In her search for the “smoking gun,” roots of the Russian state’s weakness, Stoner-Weiss revisits, in the second chapter of the book, the formation of a politico-economic amalgam during the late Soviet era and the very “structure of the late Soviet system and the rapidity and nature of its collapse” (Pp. 23-24). It was during the Gorbachev years that regional authorities joined forces with local businessmen in their opposition to the Center, an outcome of the metamorphosis of directors of important, previously state-controlled enterprises into “powerful, autonomous political forces” that no longer accepted directives from the state (P. 28). These newly empowered elites resorted to bartering, starting their own cooperatives and joint ventures, and engaging in rent-seeking activities (P. 30). Stoner-Weiss points out that these enterpreneurchiki (the re-incarnated former communist apparatchiki)^[8] strived to avoid taxation and competition and chose, for that reason, to cooperate with regional authorities who could provide them with necessary protection (P. 14). Accordingly, it was for the sake of egotistic pragmatic reasons that major economic and political players in the regions arrived at an understanding and formed a mutually beneficial relationship aimed at defying Moscow’s intervention in their provincial affairs.
The next three chapters of the book provide an original set of empirical data. Chapter 3 analyzes in detail the “war of the laws” during 1994-1999 (P. 49). Relying on media publications, the author evaluates the regional non-observance of individual bilateral treaties and finds evidence that the regions were the most resistant to federal interference in economic (and not social) policies. Furthermore, the fact (according to her data) that the least obedient regions were the wealthiest ones, in contrast to those with non-Russian majorities, according to the author, demonstrates that in the regional insubordination of the Center “economic variables mattered more than the percentage of the population that was ethnically non-Russian,” and that economics, not ethnicity, was therefore the “battlefield” between Moscow and the provinces (P. 70). Without further ado, the author discredits ethnic and cultural grievances as motivations for the regional defiance of Moscow’s rule, and qualifies solely economic interests, not ethnically-driven ambitions, as setting the music in regional relations with the Center.
Chapter 4 examines the results of an impressive set of surveys, which the author conducted in seventy-two regions. On the basis of the answers of the 824 interviewed authorities, Stoner-Weiss concludes that regional economic players mattered more than federal authorities in the economic (and not the social) policy dimension, as regional governors and presidents of the republics relied more heavily on regional and republican business elites than on presidential representatives. What is more, “[f]ederal agencies showed signs of capture by provincial politicians” (P. 88) as the latter hijacked and “effectively usurped policy-making authority” rather than the Center “delegating it” (P. 96). A reader familiar with Stoner-Weiss’ earlier book, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance, will note that the aforementioned conclusion is a departure from the scholar’s earlier argument that authorities from the regions with the highest connection between business and government were those who ran their regions best and turned them into economic success stories. These “local heroes” from her earlier book now come out as the rogues who, through their defiance of the center, impede the democratization of Russia.^[9]
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the role of elected public officials and of parties versus non-state actors. Stoner-Weiss demonstrates how it was in the interest of both regional authorities and business elites to preserve the status quo and to impede reform that might, they feared, impose on their interests and strip them of their assets and power. On the basis of more data (presented by the author in earlier articles),^[10] Stoner-Weiss demonstrates that, in the same way that they resisted federal intervention, regional authorities were against the development of a party system for the sake of preserving the lack of accountability to elected representatives. Weak parties outside of Moscow not only failed to play a significant role in regional politics (as they “clearly were not viewed as vital vehicles for election to provincial legislatures or executives”), but also further handicapped the Center’s control over the provinces (Pp. 112-133).
Stoner-Weiss is also surprised to learn that ethno-cultural dynamics did not lead to more active party participation. She explains this by stating that regional leaders and business elites “saw little benefit in… formalizing their particularistic interests as parties” since parties would limit their power and rent-seeking activities (Pp. 139-141). As a result of this “conscientious ignoring” of what is good for the people (political institutionalization), the “short-term ‘winner’” during Russia’s transition needed a guarantee that the “losers” would not have any way to channel their opposition (P. 141). Unable to breach this resistance of local elites, the Russian government has been incapable of using its power to implement coherent policies across its territory, and to secure better living conditions for its citizens.
Stoner-Weiss qualifies, in the last chapter of the book, Putin’s re-centralization efforts as misguided and doomed to a “vicious circle” of further particularization and clientelism destined to produce further scores of provincial “mini-oligarchs” (P. 112).^[11] Putin’s authoritarian measures (e.g., the introduction of federal districts, central nomination of envoys, the end of the elections of regional governors) are not a sign of better governance, but of cementing the weak state while causing a serious blow to further democratization (P.144).^[12] While the current Russian president expanded the bureaucratic machine through appointing rather than electing regional governors, his actions did not render the state more efficient, as a “bigger state is not necessarily a more capable state” (P. 150). Putin’s actions, upholds Stoner-Weiss, are “authoritarianism without authority” (P. 147).^[13] The book ends with the somber conclusion that a further (final?) blow was dealt to the pluralist electoral democracy in Russia.
The author’s reluctance to explore in more detail ethnicity, culture, and – if constructed^[14] – nationalist aspirations is a drawback of this otherwise well-argued book. While few would maintain that the sole explanation for regional disobedience to central power lies in ethnic differences in a multinational state such as the Russian Federation (as “[o]ne is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer”^[15]), or that Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, and other ethnically non-Russian republics are on the road to independence,^[16] the legacy of Soviet federalism deserves as much attention as the legacy of the late Soviet politico-economic fusion Stoner-Weiss addresses.^[17] It is also important to remember that regional authorities of non-ethnically Russian regions more often than not veiled their true (economic, in Stoner-Weiss’ view) interests behind ethno-nationalist discourse, which they used to achieve their ultimate goal of maximum autonomy from the center.
At the close of the third post-communist decade, one realizes that the formerly mainstream theories of the transition to democracy alone are ill-fitted for the analysis of the new Russia. It seems reasonable to believe that political scientists would profit from including in their analysis the vast knowledge gathered by sociologists, anthropologists, ethnographers, and historians, and, most notably, scholars of nationalism. Namely, it would be interesting to see a study that, based on a sophisticated research design, would revisit the relationship between ethnicity and economic factors. The combination of Stoner-Weiss’ stellar expertise in political economy with theories and realities of nationalism would allow an even deeper understanding of center-periphery relations in post-communist Russia.
These reservations, however, should not preclude the reader from appreciating the book’s strengths, which include immaculately collected and analyzed original data that provide an original angle for evaluating center-periphery relations in post-Soviet Russia. The book is a must-read for scholars of nationalism wishing to broaden their understanding of Russian federalism.