The issue of security is a dominant topic in the study of international relations. However, its importance and implications depend on the context to which its explanation and understanding are applied. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution and disintegration of the Soviet Union put forth (or brought back) a number of “new security predicaments”. In this context, both books – Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Imperial Rivals – focus on a similar topic: the security dimension(s) of Russia’s southern border. Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia centres on the South Caucasus and Central Asia; while Imperial Rivals deals with the border between Russia and China, and the precarious position of Mongolia squeezed between them. Thus, both investigations can be interpreted as part of a larger project: the debate on whether Russia is a European or an Asian power? Both studies suggest a discussion on the notions of power, security and international order in the environment of globalisation. In other words, the two books question whether it is possible to have a discourse on ‘new realities’ without reconsidering the terminology (i.e. its meaning)? In this sense, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Imperial Rivals contribute to the ongoing debate on post-totalitarian transition by providing a scholarly reflection on the social, political and economic changes in the post-Soviet space.

Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia has the potential to shed valuable light on the developments in the so-called Russia’s “Southern Tier”. The volume is part of a larger project of the East-West Institute dealing with the role of Russia in the “total security” environment of Eurasia (p. xiii). The dominant objective of Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia is to present a suggestive comparative discussion of the security predicaments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the context of the relations between Russia and the new states formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This broad objective is divided into four major segments (traditional security, economic security, ethnicity and border questions, and non-traditional challenges) in the hope of providing a clearer and more consistent account of the dominant theme.

Unfortunately, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia suffers from a lack of targeted editing and organisation. The promising analysis and structure suggested by the objective of the conceptual investigation is not followed through in the essays included in the volume. It seems that the contributors were not aware of each other’s contributions (a belief further entrenched by the presence of only three general references to other articles in the volume). It would have contributed greatly to the analytical consistency of Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia if the editors had made available the essays under consideration to the contributing authors, so that they could make their essays consistent with the general outlook of the volume. Moreover, the editors should have spelled out their understanding of the key terms suggested by the objective of this study. On the one hand, such approach would have helped overcome some of the contradictions in the present volume. On the other, the definition of key terms could have provided a foundation (i.e. common ground) for analysing the post-Soviet policies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Another editorial shortcoming is the missing justification of the division of the main topic into the four main segments. In other words, do they make sense in terms of their “representativeness” or in terms of their “prevalence” (or both)? How do they help explain the security environment of Russia’s Southern Tier?

Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia introduces quite a fuzzy (and disputable) definition of security: “the study of security encompasses issues that increase the likelihood of conflict among states, or that promote instability within them and that, in so doing, increase the risk of external intervention” (p. 5). The problem with such a definition is its premise on a substantial amount of conceptual drift: “what is conflict?”, “what is stability/instability?”, “what sort of external intervention?”. All these are interesting issues that beckon explanation and further elaboration. Regrettably, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia does not dwell upon them. To an extent, the fact that the definition of the main issue of the volume – security – is underlined by such analytical slack is suggestive of the subsequent conceptual incoherence of the collection.

Security occupies a central position in the study of International Relations, it is not a concept floating independently in the sea of foreign policy analysis. On the contrary, it is firmly anchored in the conceptualisation of policy-making and, as such, is part of a larger discussion of “international order”. It is intertwined with such issues as “what order?” and “whose order?”. Order involves regulation (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) of the exchange between the actors in the political realm; the manner in which they utilize their resources; the ends to which they exert their power; and the influence they have on the controlling function of the system itself. In this sense, order is marked by negotiation, coercion and a restriction of the extent to which interactions are worked out in the political domain, while at the same time promoting a “condition of justice and equality among states or nations”.^[1] Thus, order^[2] is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) is rationalized as a mechanism for maintaining a structure of power; and power stands for the exchange between different forms and sources of authority. In this way, a political order gives meaning to and makes sense of the relations and interactions in the international society. That is why order is about control (in the sense of checks and balances): it regulates the participants’ resources, their use and distribution. It sets the framework within which they can be meaningfully utilized, and determines the types of interactions that the members can have.

Thus, the required epistemological and ontological analysis of “security” is not present in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Instead, the collection refers to it only in terms of sweeping generalisations. In International Relations, security is understood as knowledge of order’s ability to overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence) disruptions in its patterns of predictability. It is a process of continuous sanctions (in the sense of guarantee) that the system of order protects the participating actors from adverse contingencies. In an applied sense, security indicates “a low probability of damage to acquired values”.^[3] The values of order derive from its pattern of predictability. The threats to order’s security ensue from strategic, military, social, economic, etc. sources. However, these contingencies indicate to different forms, but essentially the same concept of security.^[4] Therefore, “security can be defined as the freedom to exercise certain values”.^[5] Within this context, the post-Soviet environment demands a contextualization of “security” within the process of transition marked by a simultaneous three-fold change: the development of national identity, the building of democratic statehood and the introduction of economic marketisation. In a nutshell, these are the three aspects emphasised in the process of democratic consolidation in the post-Soviet space.^[6] These aspects (suggested by the four segments of the dominant theme) call for a broader discussion of the post-Soviet social, political and economic order and its impact on the understanding and explanation of security.

The aspects of traditional security, economic security, ethnic and border issues, as well as non-traditional challenges are dealt with in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia from a rationalist perspective (mainly in its neorealist variant).^[7] For instance Hendrik Spruyt and Laurent Rusckas (Chapter 3) give three definitions of economic security: one neoliberal and two neorealist ones (pp. 99-100). Their objective is to question “the liberal assumption that region-wide economic growth will bring benign security relations” (p. 103). However, Spruyt and Rusckas emphasise that one of the main reasons for concern in the relations among the Southern Tier states, and between them and Russia is the “lack of functional integration and economic interdependence” (p. 115). Such inference contradicts the neorealist conceptualisation of their essay. “Functional cooperation” and “economic interdependence” are the terms associated with neoliberal institutionalism (not with neorealism). Moreover, Spruyt and Rusckas discard the possibility of the development similar to the one in Western Europe after World War II, because “today’s post-Soviet conditions are not similar to those that ultimately gave rise to the European Community and now the European Union” (p. 115). The problem is that such sweeping generalisations do not account for how and to what extent the Southern Tier environment is different? Perhaps there are patterns, which can become sources for similar developments? For example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or some regional structures (i.e. GUUAM – the grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) can play the community-building role, which the United States and the European Steel and Coal Community played in post-World War II Western Europe.

Spruyt and Rusckas’ article is symptomatic of the entire volume. Most essays conclude with policy recommendations conducive to cooperation (see p. 81, p. 143, p. 199, p. 249), which, however, are underscored by a neorealist understanding of security. This can be interpreted as an analytical error of overdetermination. The volume seems to advance a strong foreign policy agenda: Russia should co-operate more closely with the new states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. However, such synthesis (although desirable and unavoidable) contradicts the rationalism of Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Instead, the policy recommendations discuss what ought to be (logic of probability) rather than what is/ or will be (logic of possibility).

The conclusion of the book is in concurrence with the conceptual slack of Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Instead of bringing together the main themes and ideas of the volume it introduces the analysis of policy: it “is always a matter of perceptions and interests” (p. 251). However, it emphasises the importance of “perceptions” and “interests” from a Russian point of view, which is in sharp contradiction with the intent “to avoid a top-down, Russia-centred approach” (p. 4) outlined in the “Introduction”. Thus, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia fails in its main aim: to provide a comprehensive exploration of the security environment of Russia and its neighbours in the Southern Tier. Instead of giving an account of the internal and external aspects of different security predicaments and their interplay, the volume presents a collection of conceptually contradicting essays, whose views do not mesh in together. In order to fulfil its methodological, conceptual and ideational potential, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia would require a thorough and careful re-editing.

Imperial Rivals in this respect is an altogether different work. S.C.M. Paine presents an extremely erudite and meticulously researched study of the border dispute between Russia and China. He approaches his topic from a historical perspective. Nevertheless, his account has the potential to inform policy analysis as well as suggest policy-making.

Paine’s main concern is the evolution of the Russo-Chinese frontier from a remote periphery to a central concern for both countries. Imperial Rivals encompasses the period from the signing of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun to the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924. Paine structures his material through four chronological periods: the Russian expansion to the Amur and Ussuri rivers, the struggle for the Ili Valley, the Japanese containment of Russian railroad imperialism, and finally, the Soviet absorption of the Chinese sphere of influence.

Such organisation allows Paine to make a clear and consistent introduction and discussion of the two dominant themes in his study. On the one hand, the advent of the Industrial Revolution and how initially both Russia and China were reluctant to adapt to it. However, Russia (owing to its closer contact with Europe) developed a sort of quasi-industrialisation which allowed it to gain the upper hand in its strategic exchange with China (which remained ossified within its paradigms of traditionalism and cultural supremacy). On the other, both Russia and China began developing their own myths of original sovereignty for justification of contending territorial claims.

Paine’s suggestion is that these are the two dominant factors in explaining and understanding Russo-Chinese relations: the prism for viewing the other, which these myths provided (based on false assumptions and slight exaggerations), as well as the adaptation to (and adoption of) new technologies. The importance of technology in foreign policy was emphasised in the nineteenth century through the production of reliable maps and the construction of railroads linking the periphery with the centre. China chose to insist on living within its imaginary maps, the choice that gave the Russian imperial machine the leverage to advance its own expansionist goals. It is interesting, though, that Imperial Rivals puts forth the question to what extent the current stasis in Russian policy-making (living within Soviet paradigms) is going to affect Russo-Chinese relations in an international environment where China is both the technologically and the economically more advanced country (p. 357-58)? In this context, Paine makes a thought-provoking conclusion that the Russian concentration of economic and intellectual resources for acquiring and securing remote swathes of territory in the Far East by 1905 (p. 8) drained Russia of its bargaining funds in the European theatre (something, which implicitly made the Bolshevik Revolution possible).

Thus, Russia could no longer coherently sustain its position as a Great Power in Europe, but could still make this claim in Asia. However, Russian elites refused to believe in the diminishing role of Russia in Europe, while, at the same time, Chinese elites refused to recognise that they were no longer the dominant power in Asia. Such discrepancy between myths and reality fed into the misunderstanding, which underscored Russo-Chinese relations. To a great extent, the animosity was not so much the result of particular actions, but of the inaction borne out of the fixation on the fictitious reality of mutual perceptions. In spite of the fact that the central issue was strategic (i.e. a matter of sovereignty and national security) – the exact position of the border – it was interpreted in the context of legitimacy (i.e. which government had the right to rule the contested territory). In other words, the justification for both the Russia’s and the China’s ruling elites to govern became intertwined with the issue of the boundary. Since both governments were suffering from domestic weaknesses, the myths of the original right to own the territory became a policy for self-sustaining legitimacy (p. 13).
Paine’s profound analysis calls for an appraisal of history: peering through the clouds of ideological myths, so that policy-makers can better evaluate current conditions. Imperial Rivals makes a lucid suggestion that international issues should not remain bogged down in the past. Instead, the prospect of the objectively-grounded desired future should be the underscoring motif in international relations. Paine’s normative conclusion is very similar to the one of Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, however, unlike it, the consistency of his analysis furnishes the nascent background for his inferences.

In this way, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Imperial Rivals, provide stimulating frameworks for the discussion of Russia’s position in the context of Eurasian international relations. It should be taken into consideration that both books were written prior to the current watershed in world politics: September 11. In the present context of the “war on terror”, there is a marked warming in the relations between the US and Russia. In this train of thoughts, the increased US presence in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus calls for a new re-evaluation of the security predicaments along Russia’s southern border. Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Imperial Rivals can serve as points of departure in such investigation. The latter, rather than the former, offers a rich repository of methodological and analytical patterns for approaching political, economic and social change. Nevertheless, both provide a context for scholarly discussions of structural transformation and institutional ideation.