1/2006 Language Difficulties: How and Why We Write the History of Empires and Nations

Дружественная критика: критический обзор новой имперской истории постсоветского пространства с точки зрения аналитической философии

Андреас Фрингс

1/2006

Материал публикуется на английском (на английской части сайта).

SUMMARY:

Андреас Фрингс продолжает критическое обсуждение выдвинутой Ab Imperio программы изучения “языков самоописания” империи и нации. Фрингс высказывает мнение, что присущие этому методу недостатки и отказ от четкого определения понятия “империя” неизбежно ведут к новому эссенциализму, чего редакторы AI пытаются избежать. Рассуждая в традиции аналитической философии, автор предлагает альтернативный подход: экспликацию основных аналитических понятий и интеграцию этих понятий в настоящую теорию.

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1.Ricarda Vulpius. Review of Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva. Kazan’, 2004, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2005-2-110.↩

2.Aleksandr Kamenskii. Nekotorye kommentarii k redaktsionnomu predisloviiu “V poiskakh novoi imperskoi istorii” // Ab Imperio 2005. No. 1. P. 57.↩

3.As speculative approaches, I regard Philip Pomper. The History and Theory of Empires // History and Theory. 2005. Vol. 44. Pp. 1-27; and Réal Fillion. Moving beyond Biopower. Hardt and Negri’s Post-Foucauldian Speculative Philosophy of History // Ibid. Pp. 47-72.↩

4.Richard Hellie. The Structure of Russian Imperial History // History and Theory. 2005. Vol. 44. Pp. 88-112.↩

5.My reference to analytical philosophy of science is furthermore legitimated by the fact that it was the first philosophical paradigm that performed the linguistic turn – long before Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida published their path-breaking works. Moreover, the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy was probably much more radical than the one in French philosophy. See, above all, Willard van Orman Quine. Two Dogmas of Empiricism // The Philosophical Review. 1951. Vol. 60. No. 1. Pp. 20-43; Idem. From a Logical Point of View (9 Logico-Philosophical Essays). Cambridge, 1953; Idem. Word and Object. New York 1960. Much of postmodern and post-structural offenses against “modern” rationalism might have been dispensable if philosophers and humanists had read these texts.↩

6.See Imre Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge, 1977; Mark Bevir: Objectivity in History // History and Theory. 1994. Vol. 33. No. 3. Pp. 328-344.↩

7.As long as the editors of Ab Imperio do not formulate a theory (in a strict understanding of the word) themselves, their criticism of older approaches is somehow empty. I will argue that they have not yet prepared a theory or a concise method.↩

8.I. Gerasimov et al., In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 33.↩

9.Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires. New York, 2001. P. 1. He underlines this thought in Alexander J. Motyl. Revolutions, Nations, Empires. Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. New York, 1999. P. 6: “We are not only free to approach history in general and the history of revolutions, nations and empires in particular from our own vantage point, with our own logic, and our own concepts but we have no choice but to do so.” The editors of Ab Imperio go another way: “The problem of definition in this case ought to be solved historically rather than through abstract contemplation.” (From the editors. A “Post” Situation. After Empire: Back to Ethnicity? Forward to Nation? // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 2. Pp. 17-22, P. 18.) This is useless: Definitions are conventions, and as long as we decide to keep to the conventions of historical actors, we still have to choose on whom we want to rely. History can give us definitions, but it will give us many more definitions for one term than we need. The necessity of deciding which definition is the best for one’s own research purposes cannot be made by historical actors.↩

10.This idea is expressed in different variants by Paul Grice, John Searle, John L. Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard van Orman Quine, and Donald Davidson. All of these rather “pragmatic” approaches are, in my perspective, superior to the linguistic concepts of Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault.↩

11.In the second case, “empire” is conceptualized in a stable way; and a researcher would be able to ask how and why empirical phenomena that correspond to this definition have changed over time.↩

12.Much of the following discussion of definitions is owed to Carl G. Hempel. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science. Vol. 2. No. 7. Chicago, 1952, which I have read in the German version: Carl G. Hempel. Grundzüge der Begriffsbildung in der empirischen Wissenschaft. Düsseldorf, 1974.↩

13.Renate Mayntz et al. Einführung in die Methoden der empirischen Soziologie. 5. Aufl. Opladen, 1978. P. 11.↩

14.I use the German terms “Realdefinition” and “Nominaldefinition” because there are, as far as I can see, no commonly acknowledged english translations of these types of definition. They are sometimes translated as “nominal definition” and “real definition”, but often in quotation marks.↩

15.That empires have to be understood as polities follows from the fact that most meanings of the word “empire” are more or less concerned with political structures.↩

16.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 52.↩

17.It does not help to hint at the fact that no “imperiology” so far has been able to provide “a universal theory of empire equally applicable to Russia, Great Britain, Ancient Rome, or the Aztecs” (ibid., P. 52). I guess what the editors are talking about here is the problem that there is no universal definition of empire that equally applies to all these polities. But this is a pseudo-problem. First of all, you have to define the term “empire” yourself. It might then turn out that your own definition of empire does not encompass every polity which has been called “empire” in the course of world history. Maybe one polity falls out of this framework. That is not a problem as long as this definition is useful in a wider theoretical framework. It would simply mean that this polity is not an empire in the meaning that you have given to this word. In this respect, your definition will still be universal because it encompasses any polity in world history that has the attributions mentioned in your definition.
Mark Beissinger is thus mistaken when he notes: “It is obvious that if ‘empire’ is to apply to all three of these polities [i.e., the dynastic Russian monarchy of the 17th century, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet semi-democratic Russian Federation] in some fashion, it does so on the basis of sharply disparate meanings and quite different types of relationships.” Mark Beissinger. Situating Empire // Ab Imperio 2005. No. 3. Pp. 89-95, P. 91. This is not only not obvious, it is simply false: if the term “empire” is to apply to all these polities, then it does so only on the basis of the defining characteristics of the concept “empire.”↩

18.In much of the literature discussing theoretical questions after the linguistic turn, covering-law approaches are discredited as “positivistic.” This is a misunderstanding. Positivism is (as a matter of principle) inductive – covering-law approaches are deductive. To make this point clearer: Clifford Geertz’s “reading” of cultures is nearer to positivism than most covering-law approaches. On the other hand, the pioneers of the narrative-explanation approach (first of all Arthur C. Danto) were well aware of the fact that narrative explanation does not replace deductive reasoning. In fact, narration requires causality. Arthur C. Danto thus defended the nomological approach against “ad lib. narrativism” by integrating deductive causality into a strict understanding of narration. See Arthur C. Danto. Analytical Philosophy of History. Cambridge, 1965.↩

19.Hempel’s point is that giving an existing word a scientific meaning should not lead to confusion between scientific and everyday language and thus to mutual misunderstanding between researchers and readers. Otherwise you would only create an esoteric language that has to be learned over a long time to become acquainted with its lexicon and its grammar. Unfortunately, many postmodern and poststructuralist approaches remind me more of an esoteric language than of a theory.↩

20.As Motyl notes, “Indeed, I hope to demonstrate the obvious – that only by drawing clear lines around these concepts [incl. empire] can we hope to incorporate them in our empirical and theoretical canvases.” Alexander J. Motyl. Revolutions, Nations, Empires. P. xi.↩

21.The question is taken from I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 33.↩

22.In historiography, normative theories play a minor role because prescription is usually not the historian’s task. I mention them only as a matter of completeness.↩

23.Alexander J. Motyl. Revolutions, Nations, Empires. P. xii.↩

24.Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires. New York 2001. P. 4.↩

25.Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial Ends. P. 5. In other works Alexander J. Motyl tries to explain other aspects of empires (see below).↩

26.Ibid.↩

27.See Alexander J. Motyl. Why Empires Reemerge. Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective // Comparative Politics. 1999. Vol. 31. No. 2. Pp. 127-145; Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial ends.↩

28.Mark Beissinger. Situating Empire. Pp. 89-95, P. 92.↩

29.To put it the other way around: The editors of Ab Imperio themselves arouse the suspicion of having a normative research agenda. They describe their reconceptualization of empire as having taken place “against a background in which the nation and the national state is no longer seen as the only explanatory model and recipe for the solution of contemporary problems. That is why a ‘post-‘ situation, being politically very indeterminate, can become an extremely promising research setting.” (From the editors. A “Post” Situation. Pp. 21-22.) A conceptualization of terms that follows contemporary normative, political interests, is something that can lead to fatal errors in explanations because normative sentences can never explain empirical phenomena. This is the core of the “naturalistic fallacy”. The editors should thus not criticize the nation-state as a normative concept when they are themselves very close to normative, political interests.↩

30.Mark Beissinger. Situating Empire. Pp. 89-95, P. 94.↩

31.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. Pp. 53-54. In quite a similar fashion, Sergei Glebov explicates in his interview with Anthony Pagden that the “modern language of humanities and social sciences with its logic of the nation-state as an ultimate goal of the historical process” makes us inscribe into empire something that is not characteristic of it. (Interview with Anthony Pagden: “There is a Real Problem with the Semantic Field of Empire … // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 1. Pp. 117-131, P. 127.) I cannot see how the modern language of humanities and social sciences necessarily conceptualizes the nation-state as the ultimate goal of the historical process.↩

32.Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial ends. P. 10.↩

33.This lack of consistency is most apparent in the works of Michel Foucault. It should be enough to cite from one work: “Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe I have in fact added to its meaning: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements; and have I not allowed this same word ‘discourse’ which should have served as a boundary around the term ‘statement’, to vary as I shifted my analysis of its point of application, as the statement itself faded from view?“ (Michel Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London 1972. P. 80). For a fundamental critique of Foucault’s methodology, see Alan Megill. Prophets of Extremity. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida. Berkeley, 1987; Idem. Foucault, Structuralism, and the Ends of History // The Journal of Modern History. 1997. Vol. 51. Pp. 451-503.↩

34.Alexander J. Motyl. Imperial Ends. P. 3.↩

35.In the following discussion I refer to Alexander J. Motyl. Why Empires Reemerge. Pp. 127-145.↩

36.The factor “sufficient state capacity” can be called “sufficient” only when revival takes place; hence this might already be a tautology, but that would demand a longer discussion.↩

37.See, above all, Hartmut Esser. What Is Wrong with “Variable Sociology”? // European Sociological Review. 1996. Vol. 12. No. 2. Theme issue: Rational choice Theory and Large-Scale Data Analysis. Pp. 159-166. Hartmut Esser criticizes, along with Raymond Boudon, variable-sociological explanations as not explanatory, incomplete, and meaningless. See Raymond Boudon. The Logic of Social Action. An Introduction to Sociological Analysis. London, 1981. Furthermore I would recommend Hartmut Esser. Soziologie. Allgemeine Grundlagen. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M., 1999.; Hartmut Esser. Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Six volumes. Volume 1: Situationslogik und Handeln. Frankfurt a.M., 1999.↩

38.Ricarda Vulpius. Recension of Gerasimov, I.V.; Glebov, S.V.; Kaplunovskii, A.P.; Mogil'ner, M.B.; Semenov A.M. (Hrsg.): Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva. Sbornik statei. Kazan’, 2004, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2005-2-110.↩

39.Alexander J. Motyl. Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality. Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR. New York, 1990. P. 18.↩

40.Following the Durhem-Quine hypothesis (in English it is usually known as confirmation holism or epistemological holism), the truth of any statement can be tested only within the wider framework of the language of which it is part. When phenomena can be observed that seem to contradict your assumptions, you have innumerable possibilities to adjust any part of the whole language to get it right again. This holism is unavoidable and one of many problems of finding out whether a statement is true. Constructivism does not seem to be an alternative for these questions of historical ontology.↩

41.I guess the editors of Ab Imperio would even reject the idea that they make use of law-like assumptions. This would, however, be a rather positivistic understanding of their work. In fact, any scientific explanation makes use of law-like assumptions because our language is already structured in a deductive way. It is one of the main scientific tasks to make these implicit assumptions explicit.↩

42.From the Editors. Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation as a Research Problem and Political Dilemma // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 1. Pp. 23-32, 26. On P. 27 the editors give a similar argument: “The problem here is that traces of representation and self-reflection left by empires cannot be related to our modern conceptual apparatus and sociopolitical experience.” First, I do not understand why these traces need to be related to our sociopolitical experience (absolutism as a historical phenomenon cannot be related to our experience as well – and why should we restrict historiography to the times that we experience ourselves?), and second, I do not understand why these traces cannot be related to our conceptual apparatus – in this case our existing conceptual status might make problems, but this is not a principal problem. Contrarily, this would only mean that we have to develop a better conceptual apparatus.↩

43.See for example the works of Avner Greif. Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa // Robert H. Bates, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast (Eds.). Analytic Narratives. Princeton, 1998. Pp. 23-63; Idem. Political Organizations, Social Structure, and Institutional Success: Reflections From Genoa and Venice During the Commercial Revolution // The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1995. Vol. 151. No. 4. Pp. 734-40; Idem. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society. A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies // The Journal of Political Economy. 1994. Vol. 102. No. 5. Pp. 912-50; Idem. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge, 2006. If even mediaeval phenomena can be described within the modern system of universal scientific knowledge – why not the Russian empire?↩

44.From the Editors. Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation… P. 27.↩

45.Ibid.↩

46.Ibid.↩

47.For this question see Willard van Orman Quine. Word and Object; Donald Davidson: Radical Interpretation // Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Ed. by Donald Davidson. Oxford, 1991. Pp. 125-140; Gabriele Cappai. Kulturrelativismus und Übersetzbarkeit des kulturell Fremden in der Sicht von Quine und Davidson. Eine Beobachtung aus sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive // Zeitschrift für Soziologie. 2000. Bd. 29. Pp. 253-274; Oliver Robert Scholz. Verstehen und Rationalität. Untersuchungen zu den Grundlagen von Hermeneutik und Sprachphilosophie. Frankfurt a.M., 1999; Andreas Frings, Johannes Marx. Wenn Diskurse baden gehen. Eine handlungstheoretische Fundierung der Diskursanalyse. To appear in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. 2006. No. 1.↩

48.From the Editors. Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation... P. 27.↩

49.Ibid. Pp. 23-32, P. 27.↩

50.Ibid., Pp. 29-30.↩

51.William G. Rosenberg. The Problems of Empire in Imperial Russia // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 3. Pp. 543-469, P. 456.↩

52.Jürgen Habermas. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2: Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft. 4. Aufl., Frankfurt a.M., 1987. P. 223.↩

53.See Kimitaka Matsuzato. Russian “Imperiology” and Area Studies (Impressions on the Berlin Congress) // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 3. P. 443-445.↩

54.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 53.↩

55.Jürgen Osterhammel. Recension of Kathleen Wilson (ed.): A New Imperial History. Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004 // sehepunkte. 2005. Vol. 5. No. 4 [15.04.2005], http://www.sehepunkte.historicum.net/2005/04/6602.html.↩

56.Michael Doyle. Empires. Ithaca, 1986. P. 45.↩

57.The same holds true for Ab Imperio. In their editorial remarks for the third issue in 2005, they say that some of their contributions “clearly demonstrate that in reality the differentiation between ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ is superficial.” (From The Editors. Empire as a “Claim,” Nation as a “Resolution.” Languages for Describing Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural Setting // Ab Imperio. 2005. No. 3. Pp. 16-20, P. 19. Italics from A.F.) In reality there is no differentiation between “national” and “imperial” at all, because such differentiations exist only in our concepts of empire and nation.↩

58.The same holds true for Beissinger’s older definition of empire: “empire is better understood as a claim and an outcome, and ‘empireness’ as the degree to which a polity gains recognition as empire.” Mark Beissinger. Rethinking Empire in the Wake of Soviet Collapse // Zoltan Barany, Robert G. Moser (Eds.). Ethnic Politics After Communism. Ithaca, 2005. Pp. 14-45, P. 20. No one would disagree with the fact that claims and outcomes may be an important part of empire-building. But can they define the concept of empire? How would one then evaluate the Soviet Union, which did not claim to be an empire and which only a few social scientists described as an empire before 1989? Had the Soviet Union been a state before 1989 and did it become an empire after 1989? I think the definition by claims and outcomes does not really help to render this concept more precise.↩

59.From The Editors. Empire as a “Claim,” Nation as a “Resolution.” Pp. 16-20, P. 19.↩

60.In the analytical philosophy of science, the term “research program” has had a very special meaning ever since Imre Lakatos used it for his reformulation of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. Research programs are groups of theories that share a set of nomological assumptions and differ only by additional hypotheses added to explain specific explananda (see Imre Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge, 1977.) The common core is protected against falsification. This explains Kuhn’s notion that theories are seldom falsified, but more often adjusted to incorporate what formerly seemed to be a falsification. Lakatos even added rules to decide when such adjustments should be judged as fruitful (“progressive”) or fruitless (“degenerative”). Again, many humanists have accepted Thomas Kuhn’s writing as fruitful, but only few humanists have read the integration by Imre Lakatos. This is a pity because the potentialities of Imre Lakatos for the analysis of theories in the humanities are not fathomed yet. For a comparative discussion of Imre Lakatos, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend, see Gunnar Andersson. Criticism and the History of Science. Kuhn's, Lakatos's and Feyerabend’s Criticisms of Critical Rationalism. Leiden, 1994.↩

61.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 53.↩

62.Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. New York, 1973. P. 14.↩

63.Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. P. 14↩

64.To make this point clear: Explanations reveal causalities. You ask why something happened and answer by naming the causes why it happened. This demands law-like statements; and theories are systems of related universal (law-like) statements. This is the concept of covering-law explanations that some historians are used to calling “positivistic.” Unfortunately (I would say fortunately), there is no other convincing alternative concept of explanations that could replace the covering-law approach. Even Arthur C. Danto, the founder of the “narrative explanation,” reformulated the covering-law approach and integrated it into a wider concept of narrativism – he did not abandon it. Any alternative concept of explanation would have to prove that it is at least as powerful and as logical as the covering-law explanation.↩

65.Elsewhere the editors of Ab Imperio speak of a “research situation.” See From the Editors. Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation. P. 24.↩

66.Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. P. 14.↩

67.From the editors. A “Post” Situation. Pp. 17-22, P. 18.↩

68.Aleksei Miller. Between local and Inter-Imperial. Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 2004. Vol. 5. No. 1. Pp. 7-26.↩

69.The editors of Ab Imperio seem to acknowledge this fact when they say that “the heterogeneity of the space of historical experience in itself does not provide a sufficient ground for classifying this space as a particular type.” See From the Editors. A “Post” Situation. Pp. 17-22, P. 18.↩

70.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 53.↩

71.Ibid. P. 54. Unfortunately, the editors of Ab Imperio undermine their own position in the same issue: “studies of empire cannot be carried out in the mode of ‘archaeology’ understood in terms of socio-philosophical analysis of Michel Foucault. Archaeology of empire is impossible because modern political experiences and discourses erase and re-define the legacy of empire.” (From the Editors. Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation… P. 27.) First, I do not understand this argument against archaeology. Furthermore, there is an apparent contradiction between these statements from two articles that appeared simultaneously. Personally I do not think that an archaeology of empire would be a good method for historical analyses because it unnecessarily reifies discontinuity. However, this would demand a longer discussion.↩

72.I. Gerasimov et al. In Search of a New Imperial History. P. 54.↩

73.Methodological individualism in social (and linguistic) theory does not deny the existence of collective phenomena (e.g., discourses) but demands only that any explanation of collective phenomena must include the level of individual actions.↩

74.Unfortunately, there is no place to extend this concept. For an integration of Paul Grice, Donald Davidson, Willard van Orman Quine and modern theory of action, see Andreas Frings, Johannes Marx. Wenn Diskurse baden gehen. Eine handlungstheoretische Fundierung der Diskursanalyse. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. 2006. No. 1.↩

75.Alexander J. Motyl. Revolutions, Nations, Empires. Pp. 5-6.↩

Примечания

[1]Ricarda Vulpius. Review of Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva. Kazan’, 2004, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2005-2-110.

[2]Aleksandr Kamenskii. Nekotorye kommentarii k redaktsionnomu predisloviiu “V poiskakh novoi imperskoi istorii” // Ab Imperio 2005. No. 1. P. 57.

[3]As speculative approaches, I regard Philip Pomper. The History and Theory of Empires // History and Theory. 2005. Vol. 44. Pp. 1-27; and Réal Fillion. Moving beyond Biopower. Hardt and Negri’s Post-Foucauldian Speculative Philosophy of History // Ibid. Pp. 47-72.

[4]Richard Hellie. The Structure of Russian Imperial History // History and Theory. 2005. Vol. 44. Pp. 88-112.

[5]My reference to analytical philosophy of science is furthermore legitimated by the fact that it was the first philosophical paradigm that performed the linguistic turn – long before Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida published their path-breaking works. Moreover, the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy was probably much more radical than the one in French philosophy. See, above all, Willard van Orman Quine. Two Dogmas of Empiricism // The Philosophical Review. 1951. Vol. 60. No. 1. Pp. 20-43; Idem. From a Logical Point of View (9 Logico-Philosophical Essays). Cambridge, 1953; Idem. Word and Object. New York 1960. Much of postmodern and post-structural offenses against “modern” rationalism might have been dispensable if philosophers and humanists had read these texts.

[6]See Imre Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge, 1977; Mark Bevir: Objectivity in History // History and Theory. 1994. Vol. 33. No. 3. Pp. 328-344.