The events of 11 September 2001 seem likely to bring about significant changes in Russia’s relations with the USA and the major West European states and, subsequently, with the European Union and NATO.
Prior to September 2001, Russia’s relations with the West as a whole and with the USA had been improving since the low point of 1999, when Russia froze relations with NATO following Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The Putin leadership has sought full economic integration with the global economic system (by seeking to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO)), which means that it seeks a cooperative relationship with the West (The USA and the European Union), which dominates the international economy.
Relations with NATO have steadily improved since late 1999. However the Russian leadership was still unhappy about the unipolar nature of the international system, and the USA’s leading role within it. The Russian leadership had been frustrated at its inability to be regarded by the USA as an equal partner, and had been especially concerned by the Bush Administration’s initial tendency to downgrade Russia further as a partner of the USA. It has therefore since the mid-1990s argued in favour of a multipolar international system.
The events of September 2001 are likely to bring about significant changes in the structure of the international system. It does seem likely at least for a short time (and probably longer) that there will be changes in the nature of Russia’s relations with the West (particularly the USA), which will probably have long-lasting effects on the nature of the international system and Russia’s place and role in it.
Since the terrorist bombings in the USA, the Russian Federation has been extremely supportive of the USA and its attempts to form an anti-terrorist coalition. It has also been supportive of the USA’s use of military force against the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network. Although Russia has made it clear that she will not participate militarily in Operation Enduring Freedom, Moscow has become part of this anti-terrorist coalition, and will cooperate in the exchange of intelligence, in cutting off the sources of financial support for terrorist groups and allowing its airspace to be used by the USA for humanitarian missions. Russia is also sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.
Russia is supporting the US response as she sees the events of 11 September 2001 as a vindication of Russia’s long held view that international terrorism motivated by Islamic extremism is the major threat to international security. The Russian leadership has, in particular, long identified Osama bin Laden and the Taleban regime in Afghanistan as major sources of “international terrorism.”
In July 2000, in an interview with Paris Match, President Vladimir Putin portrayed the threat in extremely graphic terms, speaking of the emergence of an extremist international extending from the Philippines to Kosovo. Putin stated in reply to the following statement:

Paris Match: In your words, Russia is the outpost on the path of expansion of Moslem extremism. I speak not only of Chechnya, but also of Kyrgiziya, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Putin: I am glad to hear that Russian soldiers today are at the forefront of the struggle with Islamic extremism. This is indeed the case. Unfortunately, only few note this. Today we are the witnesses of the creation of an extremist international in the so-called arc of instability beginning in the Philippines and ending in Kosovo. This is in the first instant very dangerous for Europe, as it has a large Moslem population. People who adhere to Islam as a religion to achieve provocative and terrorist goals compromise Islam. Islam is a religion of peaceable and orderly people. What does the problem consist of? You indeed know that one of the extremist organisations, which is headed by the notorious terrorist no.1 in the world Osama Ben Laden, is the International Islamic Front, which, in my opinion, puts as its task the creation of an Islamic haliphate, a United States of Islam, in which should enter a number of Islamic states, and some Central Asian states and part of the contemporary territory of the Russian Federation. Such are their fascist plans. I call them fascist, as they call for the creation of a united front against the Jews and “crusaders” as they call us. This is indeed a terrorist international. And in this sense Russia stands at the forefront of the struggle against this international terrorism. And Europe should get on its knees and show a large amount of gratitude for the fact that we struggle against it, so far, unfortunately, on our own.^[1]

These words were similar to sentiments expressed when he visited Uzbekistan in May 2000. On that occasion he warned:

it is common knowledge that attempts are under way to carve up the post-Soviet lands along criminal lines with the aid of religious extremism and international terrorism…an arc of instability has emerged in the republics on Russia’s doorstep.^[2]

The former defence minister Igor Sergeyev has issued similar warnings. In November 2000 he stated “the vector of potential threat to the security of the Russian Federation is gradually moving to the south. This is conditioned firstly, by the widening of the zone of influence of the Taleban up to the border with Tajikistan. The threat of the spreading of Islamic extremism throughout the entire region of Central Asia, which has exclusively important significance for Russia, is becoming all the more real. Secondly, the West is gradually becoming aware that the efforts of the entire global community are needed to counter international terrorism. Today the front against terrorism goes through the Balkans, Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus and the Middle East. Today Russia and the Central Asian states of the CIS are in fact opposing the main threat of the 21st century, religious extremism, nationalist extremism, and international terrorism.”^[3]
The USA’s military action against the Taleban regime is in many respects serving Russia’s national interest, as the Russian leadership would prefer to see the complete destruction of the Taleban and Osama bin Laden. The foreign minister Igor Ivanov has called for cooperation with the USA and other states in creating a new global system to fight terrorism, although it is not clear what the Russian leadership has in mind when it talks of “a new global system.”
These developments have created the possibility that there could be major shifts in the nature of Russo-Western relations. This is certainly the view taken by the US Administration. In Argumenty i Fakty on 3 October 2001, the new US Ambassador to the Russian Federation Alexander Vershbow commented that Moscow and Washington may once again become allies.^[4] On 4 October, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice expressed gratitude to Vladimir Putin for calling George Bush immediately after the terrorist strikes and informing him that Russia would not put its armed forces on alert in response to the US alert and would cancel several exercises it was holding to avoid any confusion. Rice commented that:

Indeed, that feeling, that spirit of the possibilities of a new US-Russian relationship had already been foreshadowed at Ljubljana and at Genoa, when the two presidents talked about looking beyond the Cold War to see if there was not a more common agenda that they could pursue. And they have been pursuing that agenda since those meetings. But since September 11th, its been given new impetus.^[5]

Earlier on 28 September, US Trade Secretary Robert Zoellick said that there was an opportunity to reassess Russo-US relations, and he said that the USA will speed up its analysis of Russia’s appeal to be accorded market economy status. Although he denied that rules would be eased for Russia’s application to join the WTO, he anticipated that there would be rapid progress in WTO talks.^[6]
On 5 October, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov noted that the latest events in the USA were forcing many to reconsider foreign policy approaches and stereotypes.^[7] This is presumably a coded way of stating that the USA was reconsidering its approach towards Russia, and according her a much higher status as a partner than she had been accorded previously. On 9 October deputy foreign minister Georgy Mamedov stated that Russia was prepared for a stage-by-stage development of a new framework of strategic partnership with the USA.^[8]
The way does seem open for much closer cooperation between Russia and the West in the security sphere; Putin said when he visited Belgium for the Russia-EU summit in October 2001 that Russia was prepared to make profound changes in its relations with NATO.^[9] The Russia-EU summit of October 2001 made clear that the security dialogue between Russia and the EU will intensify. In addition to existing consultations, there will now be one-off meetings whenever necessary between the EU Political and Security Committee and Russia. There will also be monthly meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee troika and Russia to take stock of consultations on crisis prevention and management. Arrangements for possible Russian participation in civilian and military crisis management operations will be developed as progress is made in the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).^[10]
It is currently unclear how the Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relationship will develop. Neither Russia nor the western powers currently know how these relationships will evolve. Much depends on the development and outcome of Operation Enduring Freedom. At the moment it almost seems as though Russia has become a quasi-ally of the USA and the West against a terrorism which is international in dimension and motivated by various forms of Islamic extremism. This would appear to be the closest partnership since Russia and the West since the alliance of the Second World War.
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai on 20-21 October provided the first opportunity for Putin and Bush to meet since the events of 11 September. It also enabled both leaders to confer with the Chinese leadership. Putin and Bush issued a joint statement confirming the intention of both nations to work closely together to liquidate international terrorism, stating that Russo-American cooperation in this sphere is a key element in the struggle with terrorism.^[11]
At the summit Putin expressed his support for the military operation in Afghanistan. Both leaders made clear that they see Russo-US relations moving on to a new, higher level of cooperation, that will move beyond close levels of diplomatic cooperation and intelligence sharing as part of the struggle against terrorism. If both leaderships are successful in transforming the sentiments of their leaders into action, it is likely that greater efforts will be made to improve economic cooperation. Alongside this, it seems likely that further progress will be made in arms control, with both sides agreeing to further cuts in strategic arsenals and even possibly reaching a compromise on National Missile Defence and the future of the ABM treaty.

How does this affect Russian perceptions of the international system and Russia’s place within it?

Russo-US relations are now at their warmest since the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin periods at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. What is noticeable is that all talk of undesirability of an unipolar international system and the consequent desirability of a multipolar international system appears to have disappeared since 11 September 2001. The creation of a Russo-US quasi-alliance and the anti-terrorist struggle gives Russia an opportunity to push for a change in the nature of post Cold War international relations. Ever since Putin came to power, the Russian leadership has welcomed the idea of closer economic integration with the West. This inevitably has a political dimension, and the desire to create a common front against Islamic terrorism may open up opportunities for a close rapprochement between both Russia and the USA, and also Western Europe.
However it is quite probable that Russia still finds a US led unipolar international system unpalatable to her, and hopes that this crisis will enable her to renew her efforts to encourage the emergence of a multipolar international system. Although the Russian leadership has been supportive of the USA following 11 September, it would not be surprising if part of the Russian foreign policy elite felt some degree of schadenfreude over the blow the USA suffered, and hoped that it may induce the USA to act in a less unilateralist way. The Russian ideal since the end of the Soviet Union has been to see Russia and the USA as equal partners in the international system, with the US-Russian relationship as the single most important relationship in the international system. As foreign minister Igor Ivanov put it in his recent book on post-Soviet Russian foreign policy:

It is a generally recognised fact that Russo-American relations continue to remain a weighty element influencing the political climate in the world. Russia and the USA, being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the largest nuclear powers carry a special responsibility for upholding international peace and security. Both states have global interests, conduct a multi-directional foreign policy, actively participate in the process of limiting and reducing armaments and overcoming crisis situations on the planet. Today there can scarcely be any large international problem that can be resolved without the participation of Moscow and Washington.^[12]

In many respects this was wishful thinking, as Washington did not have the same view of the Russo-American relationship. NATO used force in former Yugoslavia (most notably over Kosovo in 1999), in spite of Russian wishes. The USA and Britain have carried out bombing raids on Iraq since 1991, and for most of this time, Russia has opposed such action. The USA has taken the lead role in seeking to promote a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, with Russia as a bystander. Moscow has also been frustrated over its inability to prevent NATO from playing the key role in shaping a post-Cold War security system in Europe.
The blow suffered by the USA may force it to realise that the unipolar international system it dominated in the 1990s is no longer possible and that a closer cooperation is needed with other powers, including Russia. This crisis may well therefore provide Russia with the opportunity to develop a more equal relationship with the USA. It thus may enable Russia to pursue her long-standing goal of encouraging the emergence of a multipolar international system. Russia is placing great emphasis on cooperation with the USA and the EU in the anti-terrorist struggle, and close cooperation with these two other power centres in managing security in both Europe and the Middle East has been a long-standing Russian objective.
A new international situation has also an effect on the Russian internal policy in regard to Chechnya and the western perception of the problem of Chechen separatism. The Russian leadership is now in a better position than before to present the Chechen breakaway fighting as a case of international terrorism. The official Russian viewpoint has always depicted the Chechen conflict as a counter-terrorist operation by Moscow. Therefore the international calling to counter the terrorist threat to “civilization” is likely to be understood in Russia in terms of preference for the military over the political means to solve the conflict in Chechnya and also in terms of intensification of the military fight against Chechen rebels with less attention to the warnings of the EU and the international humanitarian organizations about the situation with human and political rights in Chechnya.
As to the effect of the new international situation on the Russian foreign policy, it is currently unclear whether Russia will link her cooperation with the USA in the anti-terrorist coalition with various long-standing Russian foreign policy objectives. It is possible that she may demand (or even get without demanding) concessions in the following key areas:
NATO widening

The USA may be more willing to slow down or even call a halt to the process of NATO widening, as Russia strongly objects to this process, although she has been powerless to prevent it. Another possible scenario is that NATO widening takes place, possibly even including Russia. This is likely to involve a significant transformation in the nature of the NATO alliance. The Russians have long argued that either NATO should be abolished as the Warsaw Pact was in 1991, or transformed into a political rather than military organisation. This would mean that the alliance ceases to be a collective defence organisation and would also cease to play the gendarme role envisaged in its 1999 strategic concept, which was practised in Kosovo.
If Russia were to achieve a transformation of NATO, then the Atlantic Alliance may become a form of talking shop under the OSCE, and if US forces are further reduced in Europe, with a possible shift in US interests from Europe to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, Russia would be faced with what she has argued for since at least the mid-1990s, namely a reduction in US involvement in European security affairs. The 1999 Russian Medium Term Strategy towards the EU sees a potential for the EU's fledgling defence identity possibly to diminish NATO's importance. The Medium Term Strategy suggests as possible policy steps the following:

• to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves without both isolation of the United States and NATO and their dominance on the continent;

• to work out Russia’s position on the “defense identity” of the European Union with the Western European Union to be included in it, as well as to develop political and military contacts with the WEU as an integral part of the EU, and to promote practical cooperation in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis settlement, various aspects of arms limitation and reduction, etc.) which could counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO-centrism in Europe.^[13]

The emergence of a less Atlanticist Europe with a Russia more closely tied to NATO, along with the probable development of EU military structures (with which Russia strongly desires to cooperate), may result in Russia having a much greater say in the management of security in Europe.

National Missile Defence
NMD has been a major stumbling block in the development of a harmonious Russo-US relationship. Differences still remain, and whether they can be resolved (either partly or fully) remains to be seen. However, given the importance of Russia as a partner to the USA, Washington may be willing to become more flexible, despite the lack of progress at the Bush-Putin summit in November 2001.

Middle East
There have been no major differences between the USA and Russia over the Arab-Israeli dispute for some years. Both Russia and the USA (and also the EU) support the Mitchell Plan as the basis for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Russo-Israeli relations have developed quite smoothly since the break up of the USSR in 1991, overcoming the legacy of hostility and suspicion that characterised much of the Soviet period. Russia now has fairly cordial relations with both Israel and the Arab states bordering her. However, her economic and political weakness has meant that she has been unable to play any significant role in trying to broker a settlement and she has been forced to let the USA play this role on its own. Moscow has largely been content to do this, as it has no more idea than the USA has of how to reach a breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinians. Ideally, Russia would like to return to the Middle East, as she has long seen herself as having the right to play a key role in this region. In November 1994, Yel'tsin's then envoy to the Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, outlined Russia’s view on the Middle East:

Russia is a close neighbour of the Near East and Gulf region. Russia has built major power stations, plants and dams – unique dams – in the region and there are many Russians there – there are 800,000 former Russians and former Soviet citizens in Israel. Over 100,000 families in the Arab world are related to families in Russia. Almost 20 million Russian Muslims regularly visit Mecca in their tens of thousands.^[14]

Posuvalyuk's comments refer to the legacy of USSR-Middle East ties as a basis for the continuation of Russian interests in the Middle East. The Russian foreign policy community's sentiment that Russia should be recognised as a great power, provides a further reason why Russia should play an active independent role in the Middle East. In April 1994, Posuvalyuk outlined Russian policy goals as follows:

Russia, as a great power, has two key roles with regard to the Middle East. Firstly, it is a close neighbour, a major power with very broad interests, economic, political, spiritual, religious, and, of course, military. Its second role is as a permanent member of the Security Council and a co-sponsor alongside the USA in the Middle East peace process.^[15]

This remains the current state of affairs, and it is quite possible that one could imagine the USA encouraging Russia to play a greater role in the Middle East as part of the anti-terrorist coalition. The possibility of some international force being deployed in order to guarantee a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians was mentioned by the Igor Ivanov in July 2001, and Russia may well form part of such a force if such a settlement is reached.^[16] Indeed, in March 1994, then foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev spoke of the possibility of Russian peacekeepers being deployed to keep peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.^[17]
More determined efforts by the USA, EU and Russia to try and broker a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians may lead to the creation of some sort of OSCE type regional security system in the Middle East, something that Moscow has advocated for several years. If such a system is created, then Russia is likely to play a major role, partly due to her history of close relations during the Soviet period with the Palestinian leadership, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Her traditionally close ties with those states may enable Russia to play a major role in encouraging these states to enter into any security system that may emerge, although the inclusion of Iraq into such a system would probably only come under a post Saddam Hussein leadership.

Economic/Financial Issues
As discussed above, Russian entry into the WTO may be accelerated, although some in the Russian leadership may be cautious about rapid entry, as they fear that it may have a negative impact on Russia’s relatively uncompetitive economy. Western powers may also take a more flexible attitude over Russia’s debt.

Europe
The development of closer ties with Europe, particularly the European Union (EU) has been a long-standing Russian aim. It was an objective of both the Gorbachev and Yeltsin leaderships, but has received renewed emphasis under Putin. The Putin leadership has emphasised that Russia is above all a European power, and sees itself as an integral part of a greater Europe in all aspects, political, economic, military, social, spiritual and cultural. As Putin said at the Russia-EU summit in Moscow in May 2000:

You know that for Russia relations with Europe, with a united Europe, have always been, are and I am hoping that in the long historic term will continue to be a priority. The fundamental principles which unite Europe are also the basis of policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has always been, is and will continue to be a European country in terms of its location, culture and the level of economic integration.^[18]

This stance may be regarded as the logical continuation of the concept of the “common European home” developed by Gorbachev in the 1980s. In October 2000, Putin welcomed the idea of a Greater Europe, and said that “I think that in this context we shall develop our relations with everybody, both with Europe and with the USA.”^[19]
The post–Soviet Russian leadership has since the end of the Soviet Union been engaged in a search for allies, and finding none, has instead endeavoured to develop “strategic partnerships” with key states, partly in an attempt to counter the USA’s domination of the international system. In the mid-1990s, much hope was placed on strategic partnership with both India and China to achieve this objective, but these hopes have largely been unrealised. Since 2000 the Russian Federation has sought to develop the EU as a strategic partner, and it seems as though she sees a close, almost organic, link with the EU as a foundation stone of her post-Cold War foreign policy orientation. An indication of how Putin sees the future of Russia-EU relations was seen during his visit to Germany in 2001, where, in his speech to the Bundestag, he stated that:

Nobody doubts the great value of Europe's relations with the United States. However, I simply think that, certainly and in the long-term, Europe will better consolidate its reputation as a powerful and really independent centre of international politics, if it combines its own possibilities with Russia's human, territorial, and natural resources, with Russia's economic, cultural, and defence potential.^[20]

This statement makes clear Putin’s desire to develop the Russia-EU relationship as a closely integrated entity in a direction which may not be hostile to, but is conceived of as independent to the USA, and could therefore in the long-term go in directions that diverge from the USA. If energy supplies from the Middle East become disrupted because of instability in that region, then Russia is likely to become a more important source of energy to Europe, and her importance and weight in the Russia-EU will increase.

A new era of harmony?

Russia and the USA (and other major Western powers) now have an extremely close relationship. US Ambassador to Moscow Alexander Vershbow has said that the USA and Russia have formed an alliance unprecedented since the Second World War. The common cause of fighting Hitler caused Great Britain and the USA and the Soviet Union to set aside their differences. However, those differences were only set aside; they were not eliminated. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s perception of the international system was radically different from that of its western allies.
Although the contemporary Russian leadership is far removed from Stalin’s leadership in attitude towards the west and in its perception of the international system, it should not be forgotten that Russia’s foreign policy interests are not likely to coincide fully with those of the USA. This crisis may give Russia the opportunity to use her newly acquired partnership with the USA to pursue those interests. It should be remembered that Russia has spent the 1990s in a state of deep resentment and frustration over the loss of her great power status, and her calls for a multipolar international system are in many ways a polite means of expressing her anger over this decline, particularly in relation to the USA. The temptation to use this situation to attempt to reverse this state of affairs is likely to be strong to a foreign policy leadership that believes that Russia is and should be a great power. Russia may not be averse to seeking opportunities to enhance her position in the international arena in ways that may subtly be at the expense of the USA, whilst maintaining the essential features of the new US-Russian partnership.
These feelings may be accompanied by a certain degree of concern over the USA’s current military operation against Afghanistan. There may be the fear that the conflict may spread beyond Afghanistan to other countries such as Iraq, and Russian policy is likely to aim at developing a dialogue with the USA in order to prevent this. However, if Russia is unable to prevent any spreading of the conflict, then this may result in renewed tensions in Russo-US relations. Furthermore, if the USA’s current military presence in Central Asia becomes a long-term presence, this is likely to raise renewed resentment and fears about US unipolarity, as this would mean a significant encroachment into the near abroad, an area where Russia considers to be her sphere of influence. If the Taleban regime collapses, then there may be differences of opinion between Moscow and Washington over the future composition of a post-Taleban Afghan regime.
A Russia that acquires a much greater say in Europe’s security affairs may in the long term be in a stronger position to influence the evolution of European security systems in directions not favoured by the USA. A Russia-EU security axis may develop which in the long-term may conflict with US interests. Although Russia may come to play a bigger role in the Middle East initially as a US partner, given the instability of the region, it is not impossible that new realignments may take place in the Middle East that could bring the USA and Russia into conflict. Although Russia has a new found political stability following the election of Putin as president in 2000, it is anybody’s guess whether this stability will continue into the post-Putin era, or whether a post-Putin leader will continue the opening to the West that has been pursued with an increased vigour since January 2000.
Finally, the recent war against international terrorism cannot be regarded as a conventional war for it is waged both externally against the regime, which has been the main shelter for terrorists, and on the internal front (detention of persons suspected of being part of terrorist networks, arrest of the bank accounts suspected of being connected to funding international terrorism, boosting internal security of the states against possible terrorist acts). The latter aspect of this new type of war potentially jeopardises human rights and the somewhat fragile rule of law in the Russian Federation. For the international anti-terrorist coalition to be successful and long-enduring it has to have not only an ability to combine antiterrorist goals with the foreign policy priorities of each partner, but also to maintain common standards in regard to human rights and shared respect for the international humanitarian law and organizations. In this respect Russia’s policy toward Chechnya could be as formidable an obstacle to Russia’s participation in the coalition as her resentment of the unipolar international system and increased western involvement in the former Soviet Union.
Since 1991, the collapse of Russia’s economic and military power has seriously constrained her ability to act in the international arena. She has, as it were, been “boxed up” by her weaknesses. The events of 11 September have enabled her to begin the process of coming out of the box. In the long-term this could prove to be a watershed in Russian foreign policy as great as that of Stalin’s decision to ally with the USA and Britain in 1941, or Gorbachev’s decision to abandon the fundamental features of post-1945 Soviet foreign policy. Like those two watersheds, the implications for the international system as a whole, and particularly Europe and the Middle East could be immense.