2/2005 Languages of Self-Description in Empire and Multinational State

Казахский язык и перспективы его роли в казахской групповой солидарности

Уильям Фирман

SUMMARY:

В своей статье Уильям Фирман делает попытку применить новый категориальный аппарат, предложенный Р. Брубейкером и Ф. Купером, для более нюансированного анализа процесса формирования идентичности. В частности, анализируя формирование нового политического и культурного порядка после распада СССР и роль языка в этом процессе, автор использует такие понятия, как групповая солидарность, чувство общности и чувство причастности происходящему.
Исследование исходит из двойственности советской национальной политики, которая с одной стороны поощряла сохранение национальной самобытности на территории СССР, а с другой – ставила задачу воспитания чувства солидарности в советском народе. Фирман считает, что с распадом СССР и созданием новых независимых государств ситуация продолжает оставаться двойственной. С одной стороны, во вновь образованных государствах проходит процесс этнитизации государственности, а с другой – руководство этих государств находится в поиске модели мирного развития многонационального и мультиязычного населения этих государств. Примером такой двойственности может служить Казахстан, на языковой ситуации в котором подробно останавливается автор.
Исследование анализирует статус русского языка в Казахстане, а также языковую ситуацию и политику в этом государстве. Двойственная политика Нурсултана Назарбаева, поощряющего развитие титульной нации и казахского языка и одновременно настаивающего на создании казахстанской идентичности для представителей всех национальностей, подвергается нападкам как со стороны казахских националистов, так и нетитульных национальностей. Особый интерес представляют возражения казахских националистов, которые считают опасной ориентацию Назарбаева на казахстанскую идентичность, неизбежно, по их мнению, консервирующую доминирование русского языка.
Анализируя перспективы развития казахского языка, Фирман утверждает, что в ближайшем будущем произойдет его укрепление, поскольку он функционирует как символ государственности. Укреплению языка будут способствовать и демографические изменения, ставшие следствием эмиграции русскоязычного населения и миграции сельского населения в города. Однако автор также настаивает на том, что русский язык сохранит свое распространение в Казахстане в силу требований экономического развития и эффекта глобализации.

1.In order to simplify analysis, for purposes of this article I accept commonly used Soviet ethnic categories. In doing so I am not implying that divisions within individual “ethnic groups” are not extremely important, or that the definition of ethnic groups is unchanging. Rather, I agree with the view expressed by Brubaker and Cooper that “grounded groupness” must be understood as “a contingent, emergent property, not an axiomatic given.” (Rogers Brubaker, Frederick Cooper. Beyond “Identity” // Theory and Society. 2000. Vol. 29. P. 31).↩

2.Brubaker, Cooper. Beyond “Identity”. Pp. 14-16.↩

3.For a report on Nazarbayev’s address, see <http://www.zakon.kz/our/news/news.asp?id=27604> accessed on 15 March 2005. In the Soviet era, CPSU ideologists refrained from using the term “Soviet nation” [Russian (natsiia), Kazakh (ult)], probably because it would require redefinition of the individual constituent ethnic groups that were also called “nations.” Against this background, Nazarbayev seems to be implying a greater unity for Kazakhstan than was ever claimed by Soviet ideologists, who used narod and khalyq when referring to the superethnic “Soviet people.”↩

4.Not all nationalists opposed the introduction of the term “Kazakhstani nation.” We will discuss a very different reaction to this term by another nationalist, Azimbay Ghali, below.↩

5.Beybit Qoyshybaev. Bizde “qazaqstandyq ult” emes, qazaq ulty qalyptasuy kerek // Turkistan. 23 September. 2004.↩

6.Curiously, Qoyshybayev maintains that in the Soviet era, ideologists began to use the term “Soviet nation” [kenges ulty]. In fact, however, in the Soviet era this term was not used, only “Soviet people” [kenges khalqy]. On this matter (though with reference only to Russian nomenclature), see Gerhard Simon. Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities of the Soviet Union. Boulder, CO., 1991. Pp. 307-314.↩

7.Jørn Holm-Hansen. Political Integration in Kazakhstan // Pål Kolstø. Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. Boulder, CO., 1999. Pp. 223-24.↩

8.Osnovnye zakonodatel’nye akty o iazykakh v Respublike Kazakhstan. Almaty, 2000. P. 6.↩

9.Kazakhstan na puti uskorennoi ekonomicheskoi, sotsial’noi, i politicheskoi modernizatsii, (Poslanie Prezidenta N. Nazarbaeva narodu Kazakhstana 18 fev. 2005). <http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=ru>, accessed on 30 March 2005. I have examined the approach of the Kazakhstan government and the major non-government organization involved in Kazakh language recovery in another article: William Fierman. Povorot iazykovogo sdviga v Kazakhstane // Etnograficheskoe obozrenie. Forthcoming.↩

10.The juxtaposition of only Russian and Kazakh, which are the focus of this study, in fact oversimplifies the picture, since many citizens (perhaps 10 to 15 percent?) were native speakers of other languages.↩

11.Frederick Barghorn. Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics: Official and Unofficial Perspectives // Robert Conquest (Ed.). The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future. Stanford, CA., 1986. P. 31. The tenacity of the ideas in Stalin’s treatise is evident in Qoyshybayev’s explicit and positive reference to it in the article cited above.↩

12.Very telling in this regard is independent Kazakhstan’s official policy of supporting the repatriation of Kazakhs to Kazakhstan from other countries, including areas of today’s Uzbekistan and Russia, where Kazakhs have lived for centuries.↩

13.Given Nazarbayev’s references to the formation of a Kazakhstani nation and the Kazakh language as a major factor in the unity of all citizens of Kazakhstan, it is worth noting that Soviet ideologists stopped short of claiming that the Soviet people shared a common first language.↩

14.Although standard literary languages have been created for both languages, great differences continue to exist among dialects of Uzbek and Tajik.↩

15.The low level of literacy, however, did not mean that Kazakhs lacked a literary tradition. Indeed, their rich oral literary tradition extended back many centuries.↩

16.See Terry Martin. The Affirmative Action Empire. Ithaca, NY., 2001. Chapter 4. For a description of the process in Uzbekistan, see William Fierman. Language Planning and National Development. Berlin, 1991. Chapter 8.↩

17.Besides the alphabet shift referred to above, Russification in the corpus of non-Russian languages during the 1930s is manifest in their greatly increased “borrowing” of Russian words. In the case of Kazakh and other Turkic languages of Central Asia, this usually meant replacing words of Turkic, Persian, or Arabic origin with words taken from or through Russian.↩

18.The case of Belarusian is somewhat of an exception.↩

19.According to data received from the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education, as of 1988-1989, approximately 896,000 Kazakh pupils were enrolled in schools in rural areas of Kazakhstan, and approximately 746,000 were enrolled in Kazakh-medium classes. It can be presumed that this later cohort contains only a very small number of non-Kazakhs. Given that the Party began to pay greater attention to Kazakh language instruction in 1987, it is possible that the share of rural pupils in Kazakh-medium classes had slightly increased by the 1988-1989 school year.↩

20.For more information on this, see, for example, Razvitie kazakhskogo iazykoznaniia. Alma-Ata, 1980.↩

21.Qazaq sovet entsiklopediiasy. Almaty DATE OF PUBLICATION IS NEEDED; and A. I. Iskakov et al. Qazaq tilining tusindirme sozdigi. Almaty DATE OF PUBLICATION IS NEEDED. Despite these achievements, it should be noted that both in the areas of terminology and orthography, Kazakh lagged behind such languages as Uzbek in terms of standardization.↩

22.M. Kh. Asylbekov, A. B. Galiev. Sotsial’no-demograficheskie protsessy v Kazakhstane (1917-1980). Alma-Ata, 1991. P. 42. Asylbekov and Galiev note that F. N. Bazanova claims the 1897 figures for Kazakhs and Russians were 74.4 percent and 8.8 percent respectively. (F. N. Bazanova. Formirovanie i razvitie strutktury naseleniia Kazakhskoi SSR. Alma-Ata, 1987. No page number given).↩

23.Martha Olcott. The Kazakhs. Stanford, CA., 1987. P. 185.↩

24.For a discussion of the major factors affecting Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition, see M. Tatimov and Zh. Aliyev. Derbestigimiz – Demografiyada. Almaty, 1999, especially pp. 33-37.↩

25.Asylbekov, Galiev. Sotsial’no-demograficheskie protsessy v Kazakhstane. P. 187.↩

26.Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan. Tom. 1: Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan. Almaty, 2000. Pp. 6-14.↩

27.Formally, Alma-Ata city was neither part of any oblast, nor an oblast itself; however, like oblasts, it reported directly to the republic level administration. At the time of the census, the city was called “Alma-Ata” both in Russian and in English. The Russian name of the city was officially changed from Alma-Ata to Almaty in January 1993. With the exception of Alma-Ata/Almaty and names for which there is an easy and standard English-language name (e.g., “East Kazakhstan Oblast”), I use English transliterations of Kazakh geographical names throughout this article.↩

28.According to B. Khasanuly, the shares were 8.6 percent in Petropavlovsk, 8.9 percent in Qostanay, 10.6 in Oskemen, 12.6 in Qaraghandy, 14.7 in Pavlodar, and 18.8 in Kokshetau. In Almaty city, Kazakhs comprised 22.5 percent (Ana tili – ata mura. Almaty, 1992. Pp. 148-158). Slightly different figures are provided in: Ana tili, 11 Oct. 1990.↩

29.GosKomStat SSSR. Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda. Tom VII. Chast’ VII. Moscow, 1991-1993. Pp. 296, 300.↩

30.Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. 23 May 1989.↩

31.Based on guesstimates of various informants in Kazakhstan, it appears that in the late 1980s somewhere in the range of 85 to 90 percent of rural Kazakhs could comfortably converse in Kazakh on everyday subjects. The proportion of rural Kazakhs who could not speak Kazakh was likely higher than 10 or 15 percent only in certain raions of oblasts bordering on Russia.↩

32.For more detailed treatment, see Fierman. Forthcoming article in Etnograficheskoe obozrenie.↩

33.Ibid.↩

34.One of the schools in Kazakhstan was a boarding school attended largely by children from other parts of the republic. The Kazakh population of Alma-Ata in 1979 was 147,000 (16.5 percent of the total); by 1989 it was 251,000 (22.5 percent of the total) (Mikhail Guboglo. Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union Republics // Journal of Nationalities. Vol. 1. No. 4. Pp. 28-29).↩

35.Without data for the number of pupils, it is impossible to identify the magnitude of the boom. However, data for the number of schools for 1988 and 1990 are available. In 1988, there were 181 schools in urban areas with only Kazakh-medium instruction; by 1990, the number had grown to 268. Likewise, in 1988 there were 242 schools with more than one language of instruction; by 1990 the number had grown to 411. (The number for mixed schools also includes a small number of schools where the mix” of languages did not include Kazakh, and might have been, for example, Russian and Uzbek or Russian and Uyghur.)↩

36.For information on how this was calculated, see William Fierman. Language and Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Kazakh-Medium Instruction in Urban Schools // Russian Review. 2006. Vol. 65. Forthcoming.↩

37.Khasanuly. Ana tili – ata mura. P. 185.↩

38.According to data from gathered from different sources, in 2002-2003 the share was 36 percent; in 2003-2004 it was 32 percent; and in 2004-2005 it was 40 percent. Data for 2002-2003 are from Nauan Sarin. ’Til turaly’ zangnyng Bilim zhane ghylym ministrliginde oryndau barysy // Ana tili. 10 June 2004; for 2003-2004 from Qabyl Duysenbi. Ultymyzdyng bolashaghy – qazaq mektepterinde // Ana tili. 12 Feb. 2004; and for 2004-2005 in an email from S. Ispusinova from the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education dated 12 March 2005. Much of the increase since 1989, of course, is related to the growth in the share of ethnic Kazakhs among students in institutions of higher education.↩

39.Khasanuly. Ana tili – ata mura. P. 185.↩

40.Ramazan Saghymbekov. Almatydan soylep turmyz. Almaty, 1979. Pp. 149-153 and information in an email communication from Asiya Baigozhina (Almaty) dated 21 March 2005. According to another source that describes what appears to refer to broadcasts of just the main program of Kazakh Radio, as of either 1989 or 1990, only 4.5 out of 19.5 hours were in Kazakh (Qazaq adebiyeti. 23 March 1990).↩

41.Email communication from Baigozhina, 21 March 2005, based on information from Firuza Perzadaeva.↩

42.See Amirkhan Mendeke. Bul qay arna? Bul – “Elarna” // Qazaq adebiyeti. 15 March 2002; Esengul Kopqyzy. Ala-qula arnalar // Turkistan. 14 Febr. 2002; and 50x50 degendi kim shygharghan // Zhas Alash. 4 April 2002. As Mendeke notes, a state-funded national TV channel was launched with programming entirely in Kazakh. However, today that station’s programming is partially in Russian.↩

43.In 1989, only about 1 percent of Kazakhstan’s urban non-Kazakhs claimed fluency in Kazakh. At the same time, almost 78 percent of Kazakhs in urban areas claimed a mastery of Russian. Itogi 1989. Tom VII. Chast’ VII. Pp. 296 and 300. Among the employed population the share was undoubtedly even higher.↩

44.The other four oblasts are Atyrau, Manghystau, Zhambyl, and South Kazakhstan (Oralbay Abdikarimov. Memlekettik til zhyly bolmaydy, biraq… // Ana tili. 27 Jan. 2005).↩

45.For a report on problems of introducing Kazakh even in an oblast with a large Kazakh population (South Kazakhstan), see Shadiyar Moldabek. Til uyrenudi balabaqshadan bastau kerek // Zaman Qazaqstan. 30 July 2004.↩

46.For Nazarbayev’s remarks see Natsional'naia politika partii v sovremennykh usloviiakh (Platforma KPSS) // Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. 26 Sep. 1989.↩

47.Kazakhstanskaia Pravda . 23 Sep. 1989.↩

48.With regard to the latter (Kazakhs first learning to speak Kazakh with each other before demanding others do so), see the account of Nazarbayev’s statement during a television question-answer session in Dukenbay Doszhan. Tilimizge quldyq uratyn uaqyt zhetti // Ana tili. 24 July 2003.↩

49.Vystuplenie N. Nazarbayeva na III s”ezde rabotnikov obrazovaniia i nauki // Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. 13 Oct. 2004.↩

50.For an example of Nazarbayev’s insistence on the unitary system, see Speech of N. Nazarbayev
on Opening of Second Session of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Second Convocation,
Astana, September 1, 2000 // <http://www.president.kz/articles/state/state_container.asp?lng=en&art=parl_sep>, accessed on 22 Jan. 2005.
This phenomenon is considered in Jørn Holm-Hansen. Political Integration in Kazakhstan // Kolstø. Nation-Building. Pp. 153-226, especially the conclusion. With regard to language, minor concessions have been made to local conditions, such as a staggered timetable for introducing Kazakh as the language of office work in different oblasts.↩

51.Sultan Orazalinov. Til taghdyry – el taghdyry. Almaty, 1997. P. 21.↩

52.<http://www.atyrau-city.kz/Rus/index_r.php?volte-face.html>, accessed on 22 Jan. 2005.↩

53.Orazalinov. Til taghdyry – el taghdyry. P. 6.↩

54.Til sayasatyn uylestiru departmenti qazaq tilin ornynan kotere ala ma? // Ana tili. 4 December 1997.↩

55.See comments by Imanghali Tasmaghambetov in: Ana tili. 9 October 2003, and Aleksandr Peirak. Vziat’ i podelit’ // Navigator. 25 September 2003, <www.navi.kz/articles/4print.php?artid=4509>, accessed on 20 March 2005).↩

56.Kazinform report at <http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?id=111029>, accessed on 20 March 2005. The ministry was reconstituted in September 2004 (<http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?id=93533>, accessed on 20 March 2005).↩

57.Nine different ministers were appointed between 1989 and 2004! For a report on Birghanym Aytimova becoming the ninth minister of education, see Esengul Kapqyzy. Kulekeev studentterding karinen qoryqty // Turkistan. 16 December 2004.↩

58.Perhaps the most celebrated is that by A. I. Solzhenitsyn. Kak nam obustroit’Rossiiu? // Literaturnaia Gazeta. 18 September 1990.↩

59.See, for example, Martha Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. Washington, D.C, 2002. Pp. 75-78.↩

60.Azimbay Ghali. Orysym – Qara ormanym // Zhas Alash. 11 March 2000.↩

61.For our purposes in this chapter, we should note that by and large these returnees are Kazakh speakers.↩

62.Azimbay Ghali. Qazaq qaytse kobeydi. Nemese optimistik demografiia // Egemen Qazaqstan. 1 January 2000.↩

63.Zautbek Turisbekov. O problemakh migratsii i demograficheskoi situatsii // Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. 26 January 1999. The low birthrate, combined with the migration trends, contributed to the drop in Kazakhstan’s total population from about 16.5 million to just under 15 million between 1989 and 1999 (Khalyq sanaghy: Ol qalay otti? // Zang. 19 May 1999).↩

64.For an analysis of the migration to Astana and Almaty, see A. Zabirova. Sel’sko-gorodskaia i mezhgorodskaia migratsiia v sovremennom Kazakhstane: motivy i rezul’taty // Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz. 2004. No. 3. PAGE NUMBERS ARE NEEDED↩

65.See “Pravil’no li my ponimaem printsip dvuiazychiia?” 2 March 2005 <http://www.navi.kz/articles/?artid=8244>, accessed on 20 March 2005.↩

66.Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan. Tom IV, Chast’ 2. Naselenie Respubliki Kazakhstan po natsional’nostiam i urovniu obrazovaniia. Almaty, 2000, Pp. 24-28.↩

67.See the interview given to Abay Mauqarauly and Gulnar Mamanova. Ultym – qazaq, tegim – orys deytin kez keledi // Zaman Qazaqstan. 25 July 2003.↩

Ab Imperio

Ab Imperio

Казахский язык и перспективы его роли в казахской групповой солидарности

Примечания